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On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform
Richard L. Doernberg,*
Fred S. McChesney**
INTRODUCTION
"Tax reform." The very words arouse a range of emotions,
from evangelical zeal to hopeless despair to bemused resigna-
tion. Whatever the response, tax reform has been part of our
politics since Congress enacted the first modern federal per-
sonal income tax in 1913. Volumes have been written on the
problems of the tax system and on what tax reform should ac-
complish.' Still more has been written on the failures of the
reform process. 2
Relatively little analysis of the rate of tax reform has been
done, however.3 This Article shows that the rate of tax reform
has increased during the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in the
much-ballyhooed Tax Reform Act of 1986, 4 and gives some rea-
sons for the acceleration. Of the various explanations for the
recent acceleration in tax reform, most are rooted in circum-
stances exogenous to the legislative process, such as changing
economic conditions. This Article presents a different model,
one concentrating on endogenous changes in the lawmaking
process itself.
* Professor, Emory University School of Law.
** Visiting Associate Professor and John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Eco-
nomics, University of Chicago Law School; Associate Professor, Emory Uni-
versity School of Law. Helpful comments from Walter Blum and Gerhard
Casper are gratefully acknowledged, as is research assistance from Mitchell
Arons and Monica McFarlin.
1. For a comprehensive listing of works, see Nacev, Special R-port A
Bibliography of the Literature on Tax Policy, 30 TAX NOTES 1019 (1986) and
updates.
2. Id
3. For a notable exception, see J. W=rE, THE PoLrrIcs AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67-244 (1985). The following outline of the
history of federal tax legislation since 1913 is taken from Witte's study.
4. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmiN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085.
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This Article's model rests on the notion that tax legislation
is a contract. Status as a legislator confers on a senator or rep-
resentative the legal authority to help or hurt private interests
through taxation. In exchange for being helped, or for not be-
ing hurt, private interests will compensate legislators. Through
lobbyists and political action committees, private interests fur-
nish consideration for the exchange in many forms, including
sizable sums of money paid to politicians for campaign and even
personal use.
The increasing rate of tax change represents a shift from
longer- to shorter-term contracts. This Article explains the in-
creasing preference for short-term legislative deals as a func-
tion of changes in the legislative structure and of increases in
the number of private interests willing to bargain for legislative
favors. It must be emphasized that no one theory can explain
all aspects of tax reform. The model advanced here is not in-
tended to discredit all other theories, nor does it explain all of
the enactment process. Instead, the model presents a fresh per-
spective that explains, at least in part, the accelerating rate of
tax legislation.
Part I of the Article briefly recounts the history of the fed-
eral income tax and documents the trend of increasing tax leg-
islation. After reviewing the traditional theory of taxation,
Part II sets forth a contractual model of tax legislation that of-
fers a different view of the legislative process. Part III then ap-
plies the contractual model to explain the acceleration of tax
legislation in recent years. Finally, Part IV considers the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 in light of the model. The Article con-
cludes with some thoughts on the implications of the contract
model for the durability of the recent changes.
I. THE RATE OF TAX LEGISLATION
A. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx
The current federal individual income tax began with a
modest bill passed in 1913 that set a top marginal rate of seven
percent on taxable income over $500,0005 and supplemented the
corporate income tax that had been enacted four years earlier.
6
Almost immediately, political incrementalism began to ensure
5. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H(A)(1), (2), 38 Stat. 114, 166. See also J.
WrITE, supra note 3, at 78.
6. See Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. See also J. WrrrE,
supra note 3, at 74-75. In 1908, the Roosevelt administration proposed both an
inheritance tax and an income tax. Despite opposition by House Speaker Can-
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growth in the income tax. From 1917 through 1920, Congress
decreased exemptions and increased rates on both individual
and corporate income taxes to finance the war.y By 1920, the
income tax had replaced the excise tax as the United States's
dominant revenue source, accounting for approximately sixty
percent of all tax receipts.8
In the 1920s, however, Congress de-emphasized the income
tax. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1924 repealed the excess
profits tax and lowered income tax rates, although the acts
raised the estate tax and added a gift tax to backstop it. 9 Fur-
ther tax cuts followed in 1926 and 1928, including decreases in
the estate tax and corporate tax rates. L0
The 1930s altered the direction of tax policy. The Revenue
Act of 1932 returned the maximum individual surtax rate to
the 1922 level of fifty-five percent and increased corporate rates
as well.1 ' The Revenue Act of 1934, while raising rates again,
focused primarily on perceived administrative shortcomings,
capital gains provisions, and a new tax on personal holding
companies.' 2 From 1934 to 1945, the Roosevelt administration
continued its attack on what it perceived to be "an unjust con-
centration of wealth and economic power."' 3 During that pe-
riod, Congress passed at least one revenue bill every year.14
In the Forties, the income tax became less an imposition on
non and a Senate that consistently resisted the income tax in favor of high tar-
iffs, both branches adopted the corporate income tax in 1909. Id at 74.
7. During this period maximum rates jumped from 7% to 77%. Ad at 84-
87.
8. 1& at 87.
9. Id at 90-93.
10. I& at 93-95.
11. Ia at 97.
12. See id at 98-99.
13. A Message to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 1935), reprinted in
4 THE PuBLIc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 270, 271 (S.
Rosenman ed. 1938).
14. J. WrrrE, supra note 3, at 100-08. In 1935, Congress raised corporate,
estate and gift, and surtax rates for individuals. Id. at 100-01. Undistributed
corporate earnings bore the brunt of the 1936 changes, although corporate
rates rose across the board. Id at 102-03. The Revenue Act of 1938 reduced
the scope of the undistributed corporate profits tax and liberalized the capital
gains provisions. Id at 105-06. That trend continued with the elimination of
the undistributed profits tax and the reduction of corporate capital gains taxes
in the Revenue Act of 1939. Id. at 107. Throughout the period, the tax system
also succumbed to increasing compartmentalization. Id at 108. Separate tax
provisions dealing with partnerships, extractive industries, life insurance com-
panies, and domestic and foreign personal holding companies emerged during
this period. Id-
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the elite, instead raising revenue from all conceivable sources
for rearmament. In 1940, Congress imposed an excess profits
tax on corporations and added a ten percent surcharge for indi-
viduals with income between $6,000 and $100,000.15 Further
rate increases marked the Revenue Acts of 1941 and 1942.16
More important, with the Revenue Act of 1942, the personal in-
come tax reached more than twenty-eight million taxpayers, as
compared to thirteen million covered before.17 With millions of
new Americans on the tax rolls, Congress moved in 1944 to
"simplify" the tax system by enacting a graduated withholding
system, tax tables, and the standard deduction.18
Following the war, Congress reduced taxes in 1946 and
1948.19 In 1950, Congress reenacted an excess profits tax to
help fund the Korean war.20 A year later, the 1951 bill raised
overall rates for individuals and corporations, but also provided
many deductions and credits that lowered rates for many
groups.21
For the most part, the Eisenhower years were a period of
quiescence for tax legislation, with one large exception. In
1954, Congress reorganized the tax code for the first time since
1913. The bill was long and complex, adding provisions affect-
ing a variety of individuals and organizations. 22 After enact-
ment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, however, Congress
restrained itself until 1962.
President Kennedy set the stage for the Revenue Act of
15. Id. at 111.
16. See id at 112-17.
17. Id at 117.
18. Id. at 122-23.
19. See id. at 131-35. The 1946 tax legislation passed easily. A stubborn
Truman administration, however, defeated a subsequent tax reduction propo-
sal throughout the following two years. Congress lacked the necessary vote to
override three executive vetoes. In 1948, however, Congress overrode a presi-
dential veto and thus further reduced taxes. Id
20. Id at 137-40. During the course of enactment, Congress weakened the
provisions "for fast-growing and depressed industries, for companies with
'base-period abnormalities' (the profit base was 1946-1949); new corporations;
regulated corporations; mining and strategic mineral income; timber, natural
gas, shipbuilders, and railroads; and, finally, airlines carrying air mail." Id at
139.
21. Id at 142-43. Groups affected included, for example, the real estate in-
dustry, mining companies, farmers, ranchers, the fishing industry, veterans,
United States taxpayers living abroad, and the elderly.
22. Id. at 148-50. Groups affected included child care recipients, social se-
curity recipients, unemployment compensation recipients, corporations with
income earned abroad, partnerships, holding companies, and closely held
corporations.
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1962 by advocating an increased investment tax credit, to be
balanced against withholding on dividends and interest.23
Although the final bill broadened the investment tax credit to
cover previously excluded industries and all new capital invest-
ment, the withholding provisions for interest and dividends
were dropped.24 The 1962 bill, the first major revenue legisla-
tion in eight years, was insignificant in comparison with the
1964 legislation, however.25 Legislation in 1964 lowered tax
rates across the board. The 1964 Act began as structural tax re-
form, but settled for selective provisions benefitting special in-
terests in addition to the general tax cuts. 26
It was not until 1968-69 that Congress geared up for an-
other run at "tax reform." The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
widesweeping, generally focusing on revenue-increasing provi-
sions. By and large, the increased revenue came from the en-
actment of structural changes, including repeal of the
investment tax credit, rather than from an increase in income
tax rates.27 The 1969 Act represented the first significant over-
haul of the 1954 Code, but as often happens with tax reform,
the final law was not as draconian as the version of the bill that
initially passed the House Ways and Means Committee.2 8
The beginning of the 1970s was relatively peaceful with re-
spect to tax legislation, but the pace quickened considerably by
the end of the decade. The Tax Reduction Act of 1971 rein-
stated the investment tax credit, liberalized depreciation deduc-
tions, and created certain export incentives.2 9 At the same
time, it adjusted rates to provide tax relief for individuals.3 0
Despite threats of extensive tax reform, no significant tax legis-
23. Withholding on interest and dividends was intended to increase the
taxes collected from those sources of income. Id at 156.
24. See i&L at 156-57. The bill also included liberalized business
deductions.
25. See id& at 158-59.
26. See id at 163-65. The legislation eliminated few major tax reduction
devices. New provisions included a moving expense deduction, income averag-
ing, a minimum standard deduction, and a capital gains exclusion on the sale
of homes by the elderly.
27. The structural changes included a minimum tax on preference income
and increased taxes on mineral properties, banks, and financial institutions.
The bill also tightened up perceived abuses of charitable exemptions for tax
purposes. Id. at 167.
28. For example, the House Ways and Means Committee failed in its at-
tempt to eliminate the tax exempt status of state and municipal bonds. Id at
168-73.
29. Id at 176.
30. Id at 177-79.
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lation materialized between 1972 and 1974, with the exception
of changes in the tax laws governing pensions.31
The dam burst, however, with the enactment of the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 and the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Antici-
pating the massive 1976 legislation, the 1975 Act was a prelimi-
nary measure that tightened up on oil depletion allowances,
increased the investment tax credit, and offered tax aid to prof-
itless industries by extending the loss carryback provisions.
32
Then, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted many
of the provisions that it had considered previously during the
relatively inactive tax years of 1972 to 1974. Although the legis-
lation contained some revenue-gaining provisions, its thrust was
to extend and create new benefits.33 By all accounts, the 1976
legislation was long, complicated, and lacking in systematic re-
form of any kind. Perhaps recognizing these deficiencies, the
1976 Congress required a study of the problem of tax
simplification.-
The pattern in 1977 and 1978 paralleled the 1975-76 se-
quence. A stopgap bill passed in 1977 presaged more substan-
tial legislation to come. Aware of the incessant growth of
federal income tax provisions, Congress entitled the legislation
"The 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act. ' 35 One of its
major features was a new jobs tax credit with a complexity typ-
ical of the rest of the bill.36 The Revenue Act of 1978 began
with the usual tax reform rhetoric of simplification, equity, and
stimulation of investment. By the time the bill was passed,
however, any cohesion in the original proposal had been lost.
37
The next important enactment was the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, a major tax reduction bill. The principal fea-
tures included lower tax rates across the board, inflation-in-
31. Id. at 179.
32. Id at 186.
33. See id at 197. One potentially major feature of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 was the repeal of the step-up in basis of assets at death, which would have
interfered radically with intergenerational transfers. Id at 195. Before the
provision became effective, however, Congress repealed it in the Windfall
Profits Tax Bill of 1980. Id at 218.
34. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-555, § 507, 90 Stat. 1520,
1569 (requiring the Joint Committee on Taxation to "make a full and complete
study and investigation with respect to simplifying and indexing the tax laws
of the United States"); see also 122 CONG. REc. 26, 131-32 (1976) (amendment
by Sen. Hart proposing establishment of a "Commission on Tax Simplification
and Modernization").
35. J. WITTE, supra note 3, at 199.
36. See id at 203.
37. Id at 213-15.
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dexed tax rates, increased depreciation deductions, more
generous transfers of tax benefits, larger research and develop-
ment deductions, a building rehabilitation investment tax
credit, and a deduction for a family's second earner.38 Overall,
the 1981 Act gave taxpayers the largest tax cut in American
history.39
The dust had hardly settled from the 1981 changes when
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 eliminated
part of the previous year's tax reduction and also tightened up
on compliance.40 In 1984, Congress again rearranged the tax
furniture by enacting the Tax Reform Act. It froze some provi-
sions from the 1981 legislation scheduled to reduce taxes and
tightened up perceived loopholes in the corporate tax area and
in the treatment of certain debt instruments.41 The 1984 Act is
notable, however, not so much for any new direction in tax pol-
icy, but for its reach into virtually all areas of taxation, as the
1300-page conference report suggests.42
Hard on the heels of the 1984 changes, the House in 1985
passed a voluminous tax reform bill.4 3 In 1986, the Senate
voted almost unanimously on a tax bill significantly different
from the House bill.44 Touted as the most comprehensive treat-
ment of the federal income tax system since the 1954 codifica-
tion, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 occupied center stage for both
politicians and those taxpayers with the most to gain or lose as
it proceeded to the House-Senate Conference Committee. In
September 1986, the two congressional chambers passed the
conference agreement, a bill that borrowed from both the Sen-
ate and House proposals and included some new provisions as
well.45 Finally, in October, 1986, President Reagan signed the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which modified the prior code to such
an extent that it has been redesignated the "Internal Revenue
38. For a detailed discussion of the Act's history, see id. at 221-35; see also
Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
429 (1983) (discussing the Act's effect on individuals).
39. Id. at 221.
40. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324.
41. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 494.
42. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in
part in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 1445.
43. See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H12826 (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 1985).
44. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 214-15 and accompanying text.
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Code of 1986."46
B. LEGISLATIVE TRENDS
This cursory historical review is not intended merely to
suggest the ubiquity or inevitability of taxes. Rather, it illus-
trates the fact that tax change is practically as old as the tax
code itself. In turn, it raises the questions of principal concern
here: whether there has been an acceleration in the rate of tax
change, and if so, why?
A recent study by John Witte tackles the first question by
focusing on all "tax expenditures" 47 in effect between 1974 and
1982, regardless of when enacted.48 The study found a rela-
tively even distribution of new tax expenditures enacted be-
tween 1909 and 1982:49
1909-19 1920-45 1946-69 1970-81 Total
Expenditure 25 18 24 22 89
Provisions
Originating in
Period
Review of modifications of existing code provisions, however,
revealed a different pattern. Of the eighty-eight tax expendi-
tures studied,50 twenty have never been modified once en-
46. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2(a), 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085.
47. "The term 'tax expenditures' means those revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemp-
tion, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a pref-
erential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability .... ." Congressional Budget
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 622(3) (1982)). See generally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES AND GIFTs % 3.6 (1981) (discussing the definitional difficulties and other
debatable aspects of the tax expenditure concept). The term corresponds gen-
erally to the popular notion of "tax breaks."
The breadth of tax legislation makes any inclusive study unwieldy and, at
the same time, makes any casual empiricism suspect. It might be possible to
count new code provisions or new words added to the code or pages of legisla-
tive history or any of a number of other proxies indicating growth in the tax
laws. None of these methods, however, would prove entirely satisfactory.
48. J. WITTE, supra note 3, at 269-335.
49. The data are extracted from J. WITTE, supra note 3, at 316.
50. The discrepancy between the 88 tax expenditures cited here and the
89 provisions referred to in the text accompanying note 49 supra, results from
the fact that Witte's study treats health and education deductions variously as
either separate tax expenditures or as part of charitable deductions in general.
J. WITTE, supra note 3, at 421 n.2.
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acted.51 Others have been modified almost annually.52 Overall,
the eighty-eight tax expenditures in existence during the 1974-
82 period have been modified 318 times as follows: 53
1909-19 1920-45 1946-69 1970-81
5 35 114 164
In other words, over half of all the modifications studied by
Witte have occurred since 1970.4
The increasing rate of tax reform is further illustrated by
the timing of modifications over the life of each expenditure.5 5
Changes occur throughout the life of a provision, not just in the
immediate postenactment period for fine tuning purposes. For
the typical provision, over half of the changes occurred more
than twenty years after its enactment. 56 Perhaps more re-
51. Id. at 312.
52. For example, the capital gains provisions have been modified 36 times
since enactment in 1921. I&
53. See id at 315.
54. I& at 314-15; see infra note 63. The percentage of changes occurring
recently would be larger, of course, if Witte had chosen 1969 rather than 1970
as the point of demarcation, because the Tax Reform Act of 1969 would then
be counted as a recent change. Id at 314.
55. The following table has been extracted from J. WnITE, supra note 3, at
316.
FREQUENCY OF TAx CHANGES, 1909-81
BASED ON THE AGE OF THE PROVISION
Year Provision Originated
Age of Provision
When Modified 1909-19 1920-45 1946-69 1970-81 Total (%)
1-5 8 3 7 21 39 (12.3)
5-10 1 3 26 11 41 (12.9)
11-20 6 18 41 NA 65 (20.4)
21-30 5 16 30 NA 51 (16.0)
31-40 19 8 3 NA 30 ( 9.4)
41-50 14 24 NA NA 38 (12.0)
+50 36 18 NA NA 54 (17.0)
Total
modifications 89 90 107 32 318 (100.0)
Modifications
per year .06 .11 .20 .39 .17
Modifications per year is the "mean of the number of modifications for
each provision divided by the number of years the provision has existed. Pro-
visions are categorized by the year of origin. Thus, for example, the average
number of modifications per year for provisions originating between 1909 and
1919 is 0.06." Id-
56. See supra note 55; J. WrTTr, supra note 3, at 314. The table shows that
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vealing, the rate of modification has increased in recent years.
The modifications per year to a given tax expenditure provision
increase steadily from the 1909-19 period to the 1970-81 pe-
riod.57 Moreover, the increase in annual modifications cannot
be attributed solely to recently enacted provisions. Thus, for
the forty-five58 tax expenditures enacted prior to 1946, forty-
two changes were made before 1946 and 133 changes in the
same provisions since the war.59
A less comprehensive study by Harold Apolinsky supports
Witte's finding of an accelerating rate of tax legislation.60 The
Tax Reform Act of 1969, the first major overhaul of the 1954
Code,61 affected only 271 subsections of the Internal Revenue
Code. In comparison, six major bills since 1976 have affected
5,815 Code subsections.6 2
Statute Number of Code
Subsections Affected
Tax Reform Act of 1976 1,849
Revenue Act of 1978 664
Economic Recovery Tax Act -
1981 483
Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act - 1982 530
1984 Deficit Reduction Act 2,245
1984 Retirement Equity Act 44
TOTAL 5,815
The Witte and Apolinsky data demonstrate that tax changes
are occurring with growing frequency.
In addition, the data reveal some interesting characteristics
of the modifications enacted by Congress. For example,
although amendments to tax expenditures tend to increase ben-
efits to taxpayers, that tendency is less pronounced than com-
monly believed.6 3 Furthermore, expenditures denominated as
45.6 percent of the modifications of a typical provision occur in the first 20
years after enactment.
57. See last line of table supra note 55.
58. See supra note 50 for an explanation of the discrepancy between the
45 tax expenditures referred to here and the 43 referred to in the table at
supra note 49.
59. J. WiTTE, supra note 3, at 314.
60. See Apolinsky, The Changes Just Cost Money, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1986,
at C8, col. 1.
61. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
62. See Apolinsky, supra note 60. Since 1981, legislation has affected 3,302
subsections of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
63. The following table characterizes modifications of tax provisions by
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economic incentives, such as capital gains provisions,64 undergo
changes more frequently than do those classified as "need-
based" or "tax equity."65 Finally, the tax changes seem unre-
lated to government financing needs. Although Congress did
implement tax changes to finance the country's wars during
this century,66 the most tumultuous period of tax change has
been in the past decade, when no important new revenue re-
quirements were evident. Part II seeks to explain this apparent
anomaly.
II. THEORIES OF TAXATION
Tax change ("reform") has been an accelerating phenome-
year enacted according to the effect on taxpayers. Taxpayers benefit if more
taxpayers are covered by a favorable provision and/or if the provision becomes
more favorable for existing taxpayers. Taxpayers are hurt if fewer taxpayers
are covered by a favorable provision and/or the provision becomes less
favorable for existing taxpayers. See J. WIT=E, supra note 3, at 317-18. The
following table summarizes Witte's data, id at 315:
TAX EXPENDITURE MODIFICATIONS
BY CATEGORY OF PROVISION, 1908-81
Year of Modification
Provision 1909-19 1920-45 1946-69 1970-81 Total (%)
Benefits taxpayer 3 22 56 105 186 (58.5)
Neutral change 0 2 5 16 23 ( 7.2)
Hurts taxpayer 2 11 53 43 109 (34.3)
Total 5 35 114 164 318 (100.0)
Some specific examples also serve to demonstrate that tax expenditure
modifications do not routinely or overwhelmingly benefit taxpayers. Of the
thirty-six amendments to the capital gains provision, see supra note 52, only
twenty represent increases in or expansion of the preference. See id at 312.
Similarly, Congress increased benefits related to oil, gas, and mineral rights
twelve times, yet it also decreased the benefits twelve times and enacted neu-
tral amendments twice. Id A final example relates to the investment tax
credit, enacted in 1962. Since 1962, it has been repealed twice, reenacted or in-
creased fourteen times, and subjected to neutral changes twice. Id
64. Other examples include oil, gas, and mineral expenditures and the in-
vestment tax credit. See i& at 318.
65. Id Medical deductions are considered "need-based," and the earned
income credit is an example of a "tax equity" provision. See ida at 272-88. The
authors do not necessarily agree with Witte's classifications. Many (if not
nearly all) of the so-called tax equity and need-based tax expenditures benefit
special interests. For example, the provision authorizing deductions for state
and local taxes is listed as a tax equity provision. Id. at 277. State and local
politicians more likely see it as their special interest provision. See 132 CONG.
REC. S8231-32 (daily ed. June 24, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dominici).
66. See supra notes 7 & 13-20 and accompanying text.
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non, with a disproportionate number of modifications to the
seventy-year-old income tax system occurring since 1970. To
explain change, one must begin with an explanation of why
taxes exist in the first place. A priori, changes in the underly-
ing reasons for taxation should explain changes in taxes
themselves.
A. PUBLIC FINANCE THEORY
The traditional explanation of taxation is part of the wider
theory of "public finance" or "government finance, '6 7 which
treats taxes in one of two ways. Taxes may be merely the in-
come statement complement of government spending. Taxes in
this sense are a necessary evil, raised only to finance "neces-
sary" government spending for public goods that private
markets cannot provide,68 including socially desired income re-
distribution.69 Public finance theory treats other taxes as a
67. See generally J. DUE & A. FR1EDLANDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: Eco-
NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (5th ed. 1973) (noting that societal needs are
met either through private enterprise or through the centralized economy of
the government); 0. EcKsTEiN, PUBLIC FINANCE (2d ed. 1967) (defining public
finance as the study of the revenue and expenditure activities of government);
C. SHoup, PUBLIC FINANCE (1969) (noting that the theory of public finance ad-
dresses government services, that taxation is a method by which the costs of
the services are covered, and that other methods include borrowing, foreign
aid, and the creation of new money).
68. In a capitalist economy such as that of the United States, which essen-
tially relies on private market transactions, government provision of certain
goods and services in principle still has a role. Private producers may not sup-
ply certain public goods, for example, even though purchasers would be will-
ing to pay enough to cover the costs of production. The problem with private
provision of public goods is that, by definition, the benefits of a public good
cannot be restricted to those who pay for it.
The usual example of a public good is national defense. Everyone benefits
collectively from the construction of an early warning missile system. There is
no way to exclude any person from the umbrella of defense afforded by the
missiles. Individuals, then, have an incentive to let others pay for the missile
system but to refuse to pay themselves, because they enjoy the same level of
protection regardless of their own contribution. Because all face the same in-
centives, no one actually will pay for the defense system unless "coerced" into
doing so. Government taxation in this instance finances government goods
and services that presumably all want, but that no one would pay for unless
payment was mandatory.
69. Some people maintain that as a society we may prefer a different in-
come distribution from that produced by market transactions. See, e.g.,
Thurow, The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good, 85 Q. J. ECON. 327
(1971) (analyzing income redistribution from a voluntary exchange theory).
No one person acting alone can appreciably affect the distribution of income,
but each would be willing to be "coerced" to transfer a portion of his wealth to
the less wealthy, if others did so as well. Mandatory taxation then finances
[Vol. 71:913
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means of correcting private externalities. In other words, the
government levies some taxes to reduce the level of some pri-
vate activities that impose costs on others. 70
With specification of the appropriate role of taxation in
providing public goods and reducing external costs, much of the
traditional public finance literature is devoted to theories of the
"optimal tax" to be levied.7 1 This literature is essentially nor-
mative, however, seeking to prove which tax rates, structures,
and incidences are best in any given situation. The real world
of taxation rarely, if ever, conforms to the optimal tax models
of public finance theorists. Theoretical models of what would
be best do not even attempt to explain what is actually
observed.72
Several problems are inherent in the traditional model.
Most fundamental is the notion that taxation, as a necessary
evil, only arises once a popular desire for certain government
activities has arisen. Neither the Constitution nor any other
legal standard, however, requires that taxes be tied to specified
government actions.73 As the size of the national debt attests,
government spending and taxing have never been tightly
linked, whatever the theoretical rationale for doing so.
The lack of congruence between particular taxes imposed
and the supposed rationale for them also shows the sterility of
the traditional model. For example, although liquor and to-
bacco taxes are justified as reducing externalities, Congress has
never attempted to correlate the tax rates with the social costs
the public good of wealth redistribution that all would favor but could not ob-
tain without government action.
70. A typical example is air or water pollution created in manufacturing,
which reduces the value of surrounding lands or rivers. If not forced to take
account of the costs imposed on others, the manufacturer has an incentive to
generate the externality. Taxes on the polluter are one way to force the man-
ufacturer to "internalize," to take into account, the costs imposed on others.
Taxes to correct externalities thus are akin to liability rules in nuisance ac-
tions. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedra, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Slemrod, Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax Sys-
tem Should Be?, 36 NAT'L TAX J. 361 (1983) (discussing optimal progressivity
of the income tax).
72. Two leading public finance theorists have recently noted that "[tihe
orthodox analysis provides [no] understanding of observed fiscal process." G.
BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THlE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS or
A FISCAL CONSTITUTION xii (1980).
73. Id. at 8. For a recent summary of the large body of empirical work on
the actual link between permanent government spending and taxing, see von
Furstenberg, Green & Jeong, Tax and Spend, or Spend and Tax, 68 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 179 (1986).
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incurred as a result of society's use of such products.74 Rather,
because demands for these products are thought to be inelastic,
the high taxes imposed may just reflect the high revenue-col-
lection potential.7 5 Further, many taxes simply cannot be ex-
plained as either financing public goods or mitigating
externalities.7 6 The traditional theory of public finance, then,
provides little help in understanding why taxes change, as it
gives little insight into why taxes actually exist in the first
place.
B. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAx LEGISLATION
That the traditional optimal tax theory of public finance is
a poor predictor of how and why government actually taxes is
perhaps not surprising. Viewed more generally, taxation is sim-
ply one form of government regulation. As an entire literature
in the past fifteen years has made clear, older theories of how
government should regulate tell very little about how govern-
ment actually does regulate.77 In particular, it is increasingly
accepted that government often does not regulate in any opti-
mal, public interest fashion, but. rather that it supplies regula-
tion to particular interest groups that demand it. 78 This
perspective, often referred to as the "economic theory of regu-
lation, ' 79 sees government action supplied in response to de-
mands from well-organized groups that are willing to pay for it
in votes, campaign contributions, and so forth. A growing body
of empirical evidence shows that much regulation has favored
some groups at the expense of others.8 0 As a result, analysts in-
74. See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 67, at 384.
75. Id.
76. Consider, for example, excise taxes on telephone service or butter.
77. See generally Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. 335 (1974) (discussing the flaws of various theories of government
regulation).
78. "Regulation is . . .an instrument of wealth transfer-the extent of
which is determined in a political market-where interest groups demand reg-
ulation and politician-regulators supply it." Migu6, Controls Versus Subsidies
in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 20 J. LAW & EcON. 213, 214 (1977).
79. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
For a discussion of the public interest and economic theories of regulation, see
McChesney, Regulation, Taxes and Political Extortion, in THE REGULATORY
REEDUCATION OF THE REAGANITES (R. Meiners & B. Yandle eds. 1987)
(forthcoming).
80. For a good summary, see McCormick, The Strategic Use of Regulationv
A Review of the Literature, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS CONFERENCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE IN-
TERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 13 (1984).
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creasingly believe, the economic theory of regulation has sup-
planted public interest theories in explaining most aspects of
politics.,'
Until recently, however, taxation remained the exclusive
preserve of the more traditional public finance literature and
had not been analyzed rigorously within the economic model of
government.8 2 No reason exists, however, to believe that the
political process of taxation would not operate like other regu-
latory processes. Because taxation has a direct impact on pri-
vate wealth, one would expect private interests to work just as
hard to procure favorable tax outcomes. As with other regula-
tory legislation, private interests predictably would obtain the
tax legislation that they are willing to pay for.
1. Gains to Private Interests from Being Taxed
Although one might think that private interests would pre-
fer and thus pay for no tax at all, that is not always true. A tax
can be beneficial to some private producers if it strikes their
competitors even harder. Consider the situation portrayed in
Figure 1.
81. See Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 Az. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1984).
82. For one incorporation of taxation into the more general economic
model of regulation, see McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). For an eco-
nomic model of taxation based on majoritarian, constitutional principles, see
G. BRENNAN & J. BuCHANAN, supra note 72. Other papers have analyzed cer-
tain aspects of taxation from the perspective of political economy. See, e.g.,
Anderson, On the Unlikelihood of Sensible Tax Reform, 4 AM. J. TAx POL. 81
(1985); Shughart, Durable Tax Reform (Feb. 1985) (unpublished manuscript
on file at Minnesota Law Review).
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Figure 1
Industry demand (D) and supply (S) establish price P1 in the
absence of taxation. The supply curve is simply the summation
of all firms' marginal cost curves. Thus, at price P 1, firms earn
returns above cost, because the price is above the cost of pro-
ducing any unit of the good in question, except the last unit
produced. Unit Q', for example, has a marginal cost of C, but
sells for P1 . Total returns above cost for all units are measured
by triangle OAP1, an area economists call "producers'
surplus. '83
Suppose, however, that some firms are capital-intensive
83. See, e.g., W. VIcKREY, MIcROsTATIcS 263 (1964).
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while others are relatively labor-intensive8 4 and that the labor-
intensive firms are the more marginal, "higher-cost" ones. If a
tax is placed on labor, its effect is to increase the costs of labor-
intensive firms more than those of their capital-intensive com-
petitors. The industry supply curve shifts to S2 as a result of
the tax: the costs of all units produced increases, but those pro-
duced by labor-intensive firms rise more. The cost of producing
unit Q, for example, rises only from C, to C2, while the cost of
Q2 rises from C3 to P 2.
The firm producing the lower-cost Q units actually gains
from the tax, because the amount that costs rise due to the tax
is less than the increase in the price (C2 - C < P 2 - P 1). The
gain results because other firms have higher costs, which at the
margin increase prices for all sellers. Total returns above cost
increase because of the tax from OAP1 to OBP 2.85 As a result,
private interests will benefit from a tax as long as one or more
competitors bear a disproportionate share of the burden
incurred.86
Indeed, examples of battles over taxes between and within
industries exist in connection with recent tax legislation. For
example, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 significantly
increased the rate of depreciation for capital.8 7 Increased de-
preciation deductions translate into lower taxes on capital,
which in effect means a higher relative cost of labor. Not sur-
prisingly, the lobbying efforts pitted capital-intensive industries
against labor-intensive industries and organized labor.88 Labor
84. In a labor-intensive firm, the ratio of labor costs to total costs is higher
than such ratio for all industries on average. Examples include the textile,
furniture, and services industries. See generally Kemp, Federal Tax Law: The
Need for Radical Reform, 12 J. LEGIs. 1 (1985) (discussing tax system inequi-
ties with respect to labor intensive industries).
85. In other words, the gain in producers' surplus (PCBP2) is greater
than the producers' surplus lost (OAC).
86. The tax is like a minimum wage increase which penalizes smaller, la-
bor-intensive firms and actually helps their larger, capital-intensive competi-
tors. Even though all firms must pay the higher minimum wage, which is
effectively a tax on labor, some firms must pay more than others, thus benefit-
ing their competitors. See, e.g., Kaun, Minimum Wages, Factor Substitution
and the Marginal Producer, 79 Q. J. ECON. 478 (1965). For a similar discussion
of how higher union wage rates hurt marginal, labor-intensive firms, see Wil-
liamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspec-
tive, 82 Q. J. ECON. 85 (1968).
87. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95
Stat. 172, 203-19.
88. Shanahan, New Diverse Coalition Works to Pass Tax Bil 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1147, 1148 (1986); Congress Enacts President Reagan's Tax Plan,
1981 CONG. Q. ALiANAc 91, 92-93.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
opposed a tax cut benefiting capital, just as capital would favor
a tax penalizing labor.
Similar internecine rivalries arose in connection with the
Senate Finance Committee version of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. For example, the Committee's bill contained several pro-
visions that would adversely affect the real estate industry in
general, including longer depreciation periods and a passive in-
come limitation that would restrict tax advantages for limited
partners not actively managing their investments.8 9 Although
many segments of the real estate industry opposed the provi-
sions, many developers not dependent on income from non-real
estate sources or on capital contributions from investors outside
the real estate business did not oppose the bill.90 Similarly, the
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
supported the tax reform9 ' because the Senate bill sharply cur-
tailed the ability of partnerships to pass through losses to part-
ners,92 formerly an advantage of the partnership form over the
REIT.9 3
Thus taxes, like environmental, 94 safety,95 and other regu-
latory measures,96 can actually benefit firms that have to bear
the costs, if their competitors bear an even greater cost. Never-
theless, special interest groups apparently fight more fre-
quently for legislation helpful to them specifically rather than
for legislation that is harmful to competitors. Such behavior is
89. Starobin, Real Estate Lobby Seeks Tax Bill Changes But Cannot Agree
How to Pay for Them, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1152, 1152 (1986).
90. Id. at 1153.
91. See Novack, What Hurts My Enemy Helps Me, FORBES MAG. Aug. 11,
1986, at 73.
92. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-137 to -140
(1986); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs (100 Stat.)' 2058 (codified at I.R.C. § 469 (West
Supp. 1987)).
93. "What delights REIT proponents ... is not that REITs will win a lot
of special privileges. Rather, they are happy because competing forms of real
estate ownership-chiefly partnerships and corporations-will likely lose their
privileges. What's bad for my enemy is good for me." Novack, supra note 91,
at 73.
94. See, e.g., Maloney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 99 (1982); Pashigian, The Effect of En-
vironmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J. LAW
& ECON. 1 (1984).
95. See, e.g., Bartel & Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation:
A New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1985); Marvel, Factory
Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience, 20 J. LAW &
ECON. 379 (1977).
96. See McCormick, supra note 80, and works cited therein at 27-32.
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not surprising, as legislation harmful to competitors may bene-
fit free riders in addition to the special interest that would pay
for the legislation. Unless the special interest can capture all of
the gains from such legislation, it may be more efficient to pro-
mote specific legislation designed to help the special interest
alone.97
2. Gains to Private Interests from Not Being Taxed
Although taxes that affect sellers in a particular industry
have the potential actually to benefit some firms at the expense
of their competitors, many taxes seem to benefit no identifiable
group. Consider Figure 2, in which an excise tax of OF is levied
on all producers equally.
97. See Anderson, supra note 82, at 94.
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Figure 2
The cost increase is the same for all producers: for example, C2
- C1, representing the cost increase for the producer of Q,
equals P 2 - C3, for the producer of Q 2. All producers are in a
worse position because of the tax, as the amount of producers'
surplus shrinks from triangle OAP 1 to the smaller area FBP2.
98
The price increase for all firms, P2 - P1, is less than the cost
increase, OF, faced by all. As compared to the labor tax levy in
Figure 1 above,99 the tax here has no benefit for anyone in the
98. That is, the area of producers' surplus lost (OACF) is greater than the
area gained (P 1CBP2).
99. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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industry. All firms suffer, as prices rise less than costs.
The existence of this sort of excise harmful to all seems in-
explicable under an economic theory of taxation, which hypoth-
esizes that Congress enacts legislation to confer benefits on an
interest group willing to pay them. Thus far, however, the
analysis has failed to account for the interests of one important
group: politicians themselves. Like any other professional, a
politician has a product to sell-legislation. If that legislation
benefits some group, a politician will expect to be compensated
like any other provider of a beneficial good or service. That is
to say, part of the private gain from taxes must be shared with
the politicians who legislate them.
A legislator has the power not just to favor certain groups,
but to harm them. Even if a special interest is not willing to
pay for tax legislation that injures competitors, it may be will-
ing to pay to forestall legislation harmful to itself.100 The
threatened excise in Figure 2, therefore, can be politically valu-
able precisely because private parties may offer to compensate
legislators rather than suffer the net losses (OAP 1 - FBP2) that
would result from the tax. 0 1
Legislators can and do propose legislation, sometimes re-
ferred to as "milker bills" or "juice bills," intended to squeeze
payments from the potentially affected parties, rather than ac-
tually to be enacted into law. 0 2 The "milker" concept is exem-
plified by the reaction of at least one congressman to the bill
that eventually gave rise to the 1986 Tax Reform Act. When
the bill was on the verge of defeat on the House floor in late
100. For further discussion on this point, see McChesney, supra note 82.
101. Of course, a politician's threat has to be credible. This problem and
the ways that politicians can make credible their threats to impose taxes are
discussed in McChesney, supra note 82.
102. As one commentator notes:
Early on in my association with the California legislature, I came
across the concept of "milker bills"--proposed legislation which had
nothing to do with milk to drink and much to do with money, the
"mother's milk of politics"....
Representative Sam, in need of campaign contributions, has a bill
introduced which excites some constituency to urge Sam to work hard
for its defeat (easily achieved), pouring funds into his campaign cof-
fers and "forever" endearing Sam to his constituency for his effective-
ness ....
Stubblebine, On the Political Economy of Tax Reform: Three Papers at the
'85 WEA Meetings, 1-2 (July, 1985) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the
1985 meetings of the Western Economic Ass'n) (on file at Minnesota Law Re-
view). For a discussion of politicians' use of "juice bills" in California, see
Doerner, California's Political Gold Rush, TIME, Feb. 3, 1986, at 24.
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1985, the legislator suggested to a colleague that he not vote to
kill the bill yet. A better strategy, he suggested, was to keep
the bill in "limbo for a few more months. 'Why kill the goose
that laid the golden egg?' he asked.'
u0 3
Given Congress's ability to exact payments simply by
threatening harmful tax legislation, the fact that Congress ac-
tually does legislate might seem incongruous. As discussed
above,'0 4 some tax legislation may be bought to harm competi-
tors. Moreover, Congress may impose taxes harmful to every-
one as part of an auction strategy by which it "opens bidding"
with special interests to reduce costs specific to them. 0 5 Broad-
based tax increases commonly precede or accompany specific
tax relief measures for specific special interests. 0 6 Also, Con-
gress may impose harmful tax legislation, even when no produ-
cers' surplus is extracted, to prove that it is not bluffing.
Unless it proves from time to time that it is not bluffing, Con-
gress would encounter difficulty in extracting compensation for
threatened legislation.
10 7
3. Politicians' Extraction of the Gains
The political process of using the specter of taxation to
milk private groups for contributions hardly corresponds to the
legislative process as taught in eighth-grade civics classes. In
the civics-class version, tax bills typically originate in the House
Ways and Means Committee, 0 8 proceed through formal hear-
103. See PAC Gifts to Tax-Writers Double, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 297,
297 (1986).
104. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
105. See McChesney, supra note 82.
106. See, for example, the discussion of the 1986 tax reform efforts infra
notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
107. The Wall Street Journal recently pointed out that strong special inter-
ests including the oil and gas drillers, real estate, timber, insurance, and mili-
tary supplier PACs "are getting skunked" by the House version of the current
tax reform effort. Jackson, Ways and Means Measure Puts Biggest Tax Bites
on Some of the Most Prolific Campaign Donors, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1985, at
64, col. 1. Perhaps Congress was attempting to make good the threat of ad-
verse legislation, or perhaps it was merely engaging in an auction strategy.
Moreover, viewing "harmful" legislation in isolation can be misleading. What
appears to be a harmful provision may actually be tame as compared to earlier
versions.
108. The Constitution provides that "all Bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or con-
cur with Amendments.. . ." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 7; see generally Gallagher,
The Tax Legislative Process, 3 REV. TAX. INDIvD. 203 (1979) (discussing the
procedures by which Congress handles tax legislation). As a practical matter,
the Senate's power to "propose or concur with Amendments" enables it in fact
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ings'0 9 and committee and staff work,110 and are reported to the
full House,n ' which votes" 2 and sends the bill to the Senate.
The Senate process is similar to that of the House." 3 Once
each chamber agrees on its own version of the bill, any differ-
ences are resolved in conference.114 The compromise bill is
to originate major portions of the tax measures that Congress actually passes.
Id. at 207-08. Note that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was initiated by a Treas-
ury proposal. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX RE-
FORMi FOR FAIRuEss, SmPucIlTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY
DEPARThIENT REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT (Nov. 1984). For the majority of bills
that begin in the House, the Committee on Ways and Means has primary
jurisdiction.
109. Typically, the tax legislative process begins with hearings held by the
Ways and Means Committee, at which witnesses appear to summarize written
arguments provided to the Committee in advance. Gallagher, supra note 108,
at 204. If the legislation originated with the executive branch, administration
representatives generally testify first. Id. at 205.
110. Even before the commencement of the hearings, the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation prepares a pamphlet describing the present law and
the proposal for which hearings are scheduled. The Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, established in 1926, consists of the five ranking members of the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. The Joint Committee has
responsibility for the overall supervision of the operation, administration, and
simplification of the federal tax laws. I.R.C. §§ 8021-8023 (1982). The functions
are generally carried out by its staff of attorneys, accountants, economists, and
statisticians. The nonpartisan Joint Committee plays an important role behind
the scenes in shaping tax legislation. For example, revenue estimates pro-
duced by the Joint Committee along with the Treasury Department form a ba-
sis for shaping tax reform bills that will achieve Congress's revenue goals.
Swardson, Joint Committee on Taxes: Power Behind the Scenes, Wash. Post,
Oct. 27, 1985, § D, at 1, col. 1.
111. Following the conclusion of the hearings, Ways and Means "marks
up" the proposed legislation generally rather than-dealing with details of the
actual legislation. When the Committee finishes its work, House Legislative
Counsel along with staff members of the Joint Committee, Ways and Means,
and Treasury translate the concepts into bill form. See Gallagher, supra note
108, at 206.
112. After the bill is reported by Ways and Means, the Committee decides
the rule under which the full House will consider the bill. Under a "closed"
rule, only the Committee may offer amendments. Under a "modified closed"
rule, specified amendments can be offered. Once the rule is decided, the bill is
debated on the House floor, where it can be recommitted to committee to en-
act specified changes, approved, or voted down. If approved, the bill passes to
the Senate Committee on Finance. Id, at 206-07.
113. The work in the Senate begins with the Committee on Finance. Fi-
nance may either work from the House-approved bill or prepare its own.
When Finance reports its bill, the entire Senate considers the effort. Gener-
ally, because of its smaller size, the Senate, unlike the House, allows both un-
limited debate and amendment. Id. at 207-08.
114. Once the Senate has approved the bill, it is returned to the House for
consideration. Although the House might approve the Senate changes out-
right, more typically a Committee of Conference of the House and Senate at-
tempts to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions in
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then approved by both chambers and sent to the President for
his signature. 15
The eighth-grade civics outline of tax legislation ignores a
key part of the process-lobbying by special interests or
through their agents. The "lobbyist" is an agent of some group
or individual potentially affected by tax legislation. The rela-
tionship between special interests, acting through lobbyists, and
legislators is central to understanding tax legislation. Lobbying
occurs at all phases of the legislative process. For example, as
Treasury begins to draft a bill, lobbyists participate by provid-
ing information.116
Although no reliable evidence is available to determine
whether lobbyists or their principals provide pecuniary induce-
ments for favorable legislation at the initial drafting stage, such
inducements do play a major role as a tax bill moves through
Congress. In 1985, for instance, nearly 8,000 lobbyists paid $49
million to persuade Congress,117 averaging more than $91,000
per Congressional member. The lobbyists' payments exceeded
by over fifty percent the $32.66 million that United States tax-
payers paid as salaries to the 535 senators and representa-
tives. 81 The payments take many forms, including campaign
contributions, speech and personal appearance honoraria, and
in-kind benefits.
a. Campaign contributions
Much of the lobbying focuses on the tax-writing commit-
tees. In 1985, political action committees (PACs) gave Ways and
Means and Finance Committee members more than two times
as much in compaign contributions as they did in 1983, a compa-
rable non-election year period.119 According to a Common
Cause study based on reports filed with the Federal Election
Commission, the fifty-six members of the two principal tax-
writing committees raised $6.7 million from PACs in 1985 com-
pared with $2.7 million for 1983. °20 Total campaign receipts by
the Conference Report. Once the Conference Committee has done its work,
the Conference Report is submitted to the House and Senate for approval. Id.
at 208-09.
115. Id.
116. T. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 42-44 (1980).
117. Lobbyists' Price to Persuade Congress Hits $49 Million in '85, Atlanta
J., June 5, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
118. Id.
119. "Gimme a Break," COMMON CAUSE NEWS, Feb. 11, 1986, at 1.
120. Id. at 1, 6.
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the fifty-six committee members were $19.8 million-nearly
double the $9.9 million raised in 1983.121 Another study found
that the average PAC contribution to Ways and Means mem-
bers was thirty-one percent higher than the average received by
all House members. 2 2 Ways and Means and Finance Commit-
tee members, comprising only 10.5 percent of the Congress, col-
lected 23.5 percent of the fifteen million dollars given by PACs
to all members of Congress during the first six months of
1985.123 As the data suggest, the period during which tax re-
form is formulated can be particularly profitable for members
of the tax-writing committees.' 4
Not surprisingly, the most influential members of the tax-
writing committees garner the greatest contributions. Finance
Committee Chairman Packwood (or should that be PACwood?)
led Finance Committee members in almost all categories of fi-
nancial activity for 1985-PAC receipts ($965,517), total receipts
($5,137,569), expenditures ($1,877,125), and year-end cash on
hand ($3,545,970).125 He also received $34,750 in honoraria dur-
ing 1985.126 Senator Dole was close behind, with direct PAC re-
ceipts of $595,750 and another $417,976 for his own PAC,
Campaign America.1 2 7 The campaign contributions, however,
were widespread among all committee members.128 Further,
the 1985 figures do not reflect 1986 contributions made while
the Finance Committee was considering the tax bill.
Similar patterns emerge on the House Ways and Means
Committee, although the payments to Chairman Rostenkowski
were slightly more subtle. Directly, he showed only $5,500 in
outside PAC contributions. His own PAC, the Chicago Cam-
paign Committee, however, raised $378,321 in 1985 and reported
year-end cash on hand of $410,544.129 Overall, fourteen of the
thirty-six Ways and Means Committee members collected more
121. Id
122. See Pressman, PAC Money, Honoraria Flow to Tax Writers, 43 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 1806, 1806 (1985) (citing a study by Common Cause). For
PAC contributions to tax-writing committee members in 1986, see Hanlon,
PACs Pad Taxwriters' Campaign Accounts, 33 TAx NoTES 529 (1986).
123. Pressman, supra note 122, at 1806.
124. "It is clear," concludes Pressman, "that a seat on a tax committee
gives a legislator a fund-raising advantage over members of other congres-
sional panels." Ida
125. See "Gimme a Break," supra note 119, at 2, app. I, at 2.
126. Hook, Leaders, Finance Members Top Honoraria List, 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1169, 1170 (1986).
127. See "Gimme a Break, " supra note 119, at 3.
128. See id-, passim.
129. Id at 5, app. II, at 2.
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than $100,000 from PACs during 1985.130 Not all Ways and
Means or Finance Committee members accept PAC money or
honoraria. One who does not, Andrew Jacobs, commented that
"[t]he only reason it isn't considered bribery is that Congress
gets to define bribery."'131
The value of campaign contributions to politicians is often
misunderstood and underestimated. Even when a legislator
faces no serious opposition in an upcoming election, political ap-
petites for contributions remain voracious. 132 As Senator Rus-
sell Long succinctly told a lobbyist, "a U.S. Senator is primarily
interested in two things-one, to be elected, and the other, to
be reelected."'1 33 Even if the opposition faced by an incumbent
is unimpressive, there is no such thing as too much money.
Perhaps the value of campaign contributions is underesti-
mated because federal law limits the amount that can be given.
Even under the stricter campaign statutes and regulations en-
acted during the 1970s, 134 however, limitations can be over-
come. For example, PAC contributions have been limited to
$5,000 per candidate per election for a congressional candi-
130. Id. at 5-6.
131. Maranis, PAC Heaven: Commerce Committee Members Roll Up Corpo-
rate Contributions, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 2.
132. Consider, for example, the following:
"Representative Dan Rostenkowski, of Illinois, raised $519,000 for the
1982 campaign, although he ran nearly unopposed, and raised another
$168,000 in 1983. Rostenkowski is the chairman of the tax-writing
Ways and Means Committee, whose members, along with those of the
parallel Senate Finance Committee, have the easiest time obtaining
donations, since they are in the best position to do specific money fa-
vors for specific industries."
Easterbrook, What' Wrong with Congress?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1984,
at 57, 71.
133. Fessler, Russell Long: Tax Master and Senate Mentor, 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 797, 798 (1986).
134. During the 1970s Congress passed a succession of measures, known
collectively as the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), closely regulating
the activities of candidates, parties, private organizations, and individuals in
raising and spending campaign money. See Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971); Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976);
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93
Stat. 1339 (1979). FECA is codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982) and 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9001-9013 (1982). See also Briffault, The Federal Election Campaign Act and
the 1980 Election (Book Review), 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2084 (1984) ("while
the 1970s reforms sought to alter the nature of political fund-raising and
spending, in the 1980 campaign private wealth and special interest expendi-
tures resumed their pivotal roles").
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date, 135 but the limit is easily circumvented. Alignpac, a PAC
formed by insurance sellers, avoided the limit by having its
members make checks payable directly to Senator Packwood in
an amount up to $1,000.136 The PAC leaders periodically bun-
dled up the contributions and delivered them to Packwood's
campaign headquarters. 13 7 In this way, Senator Packwood re-
ceived more than $168,000 in 1985 from a group ostensibly lim-
ited to a $5,000 contribution.138 Multiple PACs with the same
purpose can also avoid the $5,000 limitation. Consequently, in-
surance industry PACs now number about one hundred.3 9 Fi-
nally, although there are limits on PAC contributions to
candidates, federal election law does not limit independent ex-
penditures by a PAC made without consultation with, or the
cooperation of, any candidate or campaign.140 For example, the
Realtors' PAC spent almost $200,000 during the 1981-82 period
to help candidates who supported pro-realtor legislation.' 4 '
PAC contributions must also be used for campaign rather
than personal purposes. The distinction, however, is fuzzy. Pol-
iticians are always campaigning, or at least claiming to be.
They have successfully justified as campaign rather than per-
sonal expenditures things like country club dues, Kentucky
Derby tickets, a shotgun, leasing a Cadillac, lawyer's fees to de-
fend a drunk driving suit, travel and entertainment expenses,
New York Giant football tickets, liquor, insurance for works of
art, bronze figurines for investment, golf clubs, trips abroad,
and tax sheltered investments. 142 Additionally, many present
legislators may create a de facto retirement fund, by keeping
135. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1982). See also L. SABATO, PAC POWER-IN-
SIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COAMUrTEES 9 (1984).
136. Jackson, Insurance Industry Boosts Political Contributions as Con-
gress Takes Up Cherished Tax Preferences, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 64, col.
1.
137. Federal election law requires identification of the middleman in these
transactions, but Senator Packwood's midyear report failed to mention
Alignpac until it was called to his attention by the Wall Street Journal. Id.
Similarly, limitations on individual gifts are easily circumvented. In raising
money for this successful Senate campaign in 1986, Terry Sanford of North
Carolina sent donors a guide showing how a couple, supposedly limited to a
donation of $1,000 each to his campaign, could actually contribute a total of
$44,000. Jackson, Senate Hopeful Mails Donors a Guide on How to Skirt Lim-
its on Contributions, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1986, at 69, col. 1.
138. Jackson, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. See L. SABATO, supra note 135, at 96-107.
141. Id. at 97.
142. Jackson, Congressmen Charge All Kinds of Things to Campaign
Chests, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
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unspent campaign contributions for their personal use after
leaving Congress. Senators and representatives thus have been
able to use money supposedly contributed to finance campaigns
to create their own "individual retirement accounts." Although
the law has now changed to outlaw these political IRAs, Con-
gress exempted all members in office as of January 8, 1980
from the statute.143 Thus, Packwood, Rostenkowski, Dole, and
the other senior legislators responsible for the 1986 Act eventu-
ally can take their campaign war chests with them into
retirement.
b. Speaking and appearance honoraria
Campaign contributions are not the only way to get money
to politicians personally. Potential beneficiaries of legislation
have increasingly paid legislators directly through "honora-
ria"-personal appearance and speaking fees.144 Many senators
earn more from speaking fees than from their salaries.145 Sig-
nificantly, in 1984, tax panel members received more than one
million dollars in honoraria, or approximately twenty percent
of the total $5.2 million paid to congressional members. 146 In
1985, Senators earned more than $2.4 million in honoraria.147
Of that amount, the twenty members of the Finance Commit-
tee earned more than $660,000, or more than twenty-eight per-
cent of the total.148 The single largest recipient was Finance
Committee member Robert Dole, who received $127,993.149 Of
the thirteen senators receiving honoraria totaling $40,000 or
more, six were Finance Committee members. 5 0 For the House
of Representatives, twenty of the thirty-nine members who
earned $25,000 or more in honoraria served on the Ways and
143. 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1982).
144. Jackson, Interest Groups Pay Millions in Appearance Fees to Get Leg-
islators to Listen as Well as to Speak, Wall St. J., June 4, 1985, at 62, col. 1;
Jackson, Lawmakers Got Record Fees in '83, Wall St. J., May 25, 1984, at 58,
col. 1.
145. Easterbrook, supra note 132, at 72, reports that eleven senators were
paid more in fees than in salary in 1983. "[A]nd paid is the proper word:
while congressmen use the word honoraria to make their appearances sound
like some lofty philanthropic activity, anyone else who makes a speech in re-
turn for a fee is referred to as paid." Id.
146. Pressman, supra note 122, at 1806.
147. Hook, supra note 126.
148. Id. at 1170.
149. Id.
150. Id. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the limits on retaining honoraria.
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Means Committee. 15 ' The recipient of the greatest amount in
the House was Representative Rostenkowski, Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, who received $137,500.152
Disclosure requirements and limits on how much legisla-
tors can take annually in outside fees are similarly ineffective.
By law, members of Congress are allowed to keep honoraria
not exceeding thirty percent of annual salary.153 On reaching
the limit, however, a politician can make a well-publicized do-
nation of the fees to charity.154 Disclosure requirements and
fee limits also do not apply to politicians' spouses, who often
pick up fees of their own from lobbying organizations. 5 5
c. In-kind benefits
PAC contributions and honoraria are but two of the meth-
ods used to bestow favors on those in a position to affect special
interests financially. Many donors combine their pecuniary
contributions with lavish in-kind benefits, as the movie indus-
try has done.156 Senator Pete Wilson of California received
$50,000 from film industry PACs in 1985 and the first part of
1986; movie executives have donated thousands of dollars to
Representative Rostenkowski's PAC.1 5 7 In addition to the fi-
nancial emoluments comes much free entertainment for legis-
lators from the Washington office of the Motion Picture
Association (MPA).158 One executive of the MPA notes that
entertainment and help in fund-raisers is something the MPA
151. Hook, Ways and Means Members Top Honoraria List, 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1239 (1986). Eleven of the others either were committee
chairpersons or held top party leadership posts. Id.
152. Id.
153. In 1985, the Senate raised the ceiling to 40 percent of salary. The
House followed suit in April of 1986, but reversed its action the next day.
Hook, supra note 126, at 1169.
154. For data on donations made by Senators in 1985, see id. at 1170. The
same source reports "[o]f the $2.4 million paid to Senators in 1985... $723,038
was donated for charity, leaving about $1.7 million in Senators' own pockets."
Id. at 1169.
155. Shafer, Pay My Wife-Please!, Wall St. J., May 24, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
156. See Jackson, Congress, Wined and Dined by Jack Valent Writes aRule Giving Hollywood a Tax Break Wall St. J., June 17, 1986, at 64, col. 1.
157. Id.
158. Recently, for example, one "senior Democratic member of the Ways
and Means Committee, California Representative Pete Stark, treated about 50
of his friends to a private screening of an Alan Arkin film in the Motion Pic-
ture Association's 70-seat theater," with food and drinks provided by the MPA.
1d.
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does "[f]or the people who have been good to us."' 59 The object
of the MPA's recent lobbying has been retention of
Hollywood's investment tax credit, which was finally inserted
in the Senate bill by Senator Heinz of the Finance Committee,
who said that he did so as a favor to Senator Wilson.
160
In-kind donations are also important in swaying nonelected
participants in the tax process, who are prohibited from ac-
cepting contributions or making paid speeches. For example,
during consideration of the 1986 Tax Reform Act by the Ways
and Means Committee, the Equitable Life Assurance Society
flew a dozen congressional aides along with spouses or guests to
New York, put them up at the Plaza Hotel, and entertained
them at the U.S. Open tennis tournament, restaurants, and a
Broadway show.1 61 Nothing suggests that this is an isolated in-
stance. Staffers do the actual drafting of tax legislation and
often have the ear of members of the tax-writing committees,
making it valuable for private interests to attract their
attention.
4. Evidence of Contracting for Tax Legislation
That lobbyists play some role in the legislative process is
easier to demonstrate than the nature of their role. Perhaps
lobbyists are essentially information providers, arming busy
legislators with the facts they need. The PAC funds and other
inducements that lobbyists provide 162 could just be devices to
direct legislators' attention to lobbyists' information. On the
other hand, perhaps lobbyists are in the business of buying or
forestalling legislation with PAC funds or other induce-
ments.163 There can be no conclusive proof one way or the
other. What is evident, however, is that the cash keeps flow-
159. Id. "We try to reward people.... We will get a house, arrange for the
caterer, arrange for the printing of invitations." Id.
160. Id. The 1986 Tax Reform Act provides a special "transition rule" for
certain films, which under some circumstances allows film makers to take a
credit for a percentage of production costs incurred after the general effective
date of the investment credit repeal. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 211(e)(2), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEwS (100 Stat.) 2085.
161. Special Interests Try to Influence the Tax Code, Atlanta Const., Oct.
13, 1985, at M8, col. 1.
162. See supra note 117-61 and accompanying text.
163. As stated by Representative Fortney Stark, a member of Ways and
Means, "America needs a tax bill each year (to give) a little help to your
friends." Birnbaum, House Committee Seeks Big Support for Tax Bill Through
Myriad Concessions to Small Interests, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1985, at 64, col. 1.
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ing.1 6 4 The availability of compensation suggests that legisla-
tors would not give away favors, but would require those
benefiting from tax legislation to pay for the benefits conferred.
Abundant anecdotal evidence exists to show that legisla-
tion is bought and sold.165 Examples of payments from special
interest groups to retain favorable tax treatment during the
most recent tax reform efforts are ubiquitous.166 The Senate
bill, for example, was loaded with special interest breaks with
nicknames like "the Marriott amendment '1 67 identifying the
beneficiaries. 168 Likewise, on the House side, provisions like
the "Gallo amendment" were written into the Ways and Means
Committee bill, to the enrichment of committee members. 169
164. For statistics on increased PAC contributions, see L. SABATO, supra
note 135, at 10-24.
165. For episodes in addition to those recounted here, see Jackson,
Lawmakers Got Record Fees in '83, Wall St. J., May 25, 1984, at 58, col. 1.
166. See, e.g., Jackson, Tax-Revision Proposals Bring Big Contributions
from PACs to Congressional Campaign Coffers, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1985, at 36,
col. 1. Jackson writes:
[T]he money is pouring in from such special-interest groups as insur-
ance companies that want to preserve tax-free appreciation of life in-
surance policy earnings, from horse breeders who want to keep rapid
depreciation of thoroughbreds, from drug companies seeking to keep
a tax haven in Puerto Rico, and from military contractors seeking to
retain favorable tax treatment of earnings from multiyear contracts.
Id.
167. The Marriott amendment carves out an exception to a proposed provi-
sion that would limit business meal and business entertainment deductions to
eighty percent of the actual expense. The restriction is intended to separate
the consumption element of such expenses (nondeductible) from the business
component (deductible). The eighty percent limitation is one of the few provi-
sions that appeared in both the House and Senate versions of the 1986 tax bill.
A coalition of hotels and others heavily dependent on convention business con-
vinced the Finance Committee to except business meals provided as an inte-
gral part of certain convention programs at least for 1987 and 1988. Murray,
Lobbyists and Chums from College Leave Imprint on Tax Bil Wall St. J., May
16, 1986, at 1, col. 4. The exception has been retained in the 1986 Act. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 274(n)(2), (3) (West Supp.
1987)). To qualify for the "Marriott exception," a convention must include a
speaker whenever food and beverages are included in the program. Id. (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 274(n)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1987)). Politicians, thereby, have
raised the demand for their own services as outside speakers.
168. Murray, supra note 167, at 1, col. 4. According to a former Treasury
Department tax specialist, such breaks do not necessarily come free. He noted
that "lt helps if you've been a big supporter of [a] senator ... I'm afraid
that's democracy." Ida at 13, col. 4.
169. Jackson, Some Ways and Means Members Saw a Surge in Contribu-
tions During Tax-Overhaul Battle, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1986, at 64, col. 1. See
also Jackson, supra note 107. Ernest and Julio Gallo, California winemakers
with more than twenty grandchildren and an estimated net worth of $600 mil-
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Thus, although the 1986 amendments to the basic income tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were hailed as major
tax reform, they also became a bonanza for the reformers.1 70
The record abounds with other examples of campaign do-
nations followed closely by favorable legislation. 171 Two essen-
tial points emerge. First, the tax "reform" promulgated by
Congress is often the reform someone is willing to purchase.
Second, many of the purchases are payments to avoid infliction
of new economic pain rather than to obtain reform of painful
provisions already in existence.
A final example illustrates the value of threatening tax
legislation just to raise cash from private interests. As dis-
cussed above, excise taxes diminish firms' wealth, and so, firms
predictably would be willing to pay politicians not to impose ex-
cises.1 72 In fact, private interests do just that. Without even
proposing an increase in the excise tax on beer,173 legislators
lion, were upset with a generation-skipping transfer tax provision of Treas-
ury's initial tax reform bill. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting
Proposed Legislation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 707 (May 29, 1985). The
provision would tighten up the generation-skipping tax by making it applicable
to direct intergenerational transfers. The purpose of the generation-skipping
tax is to ensure that wealth is taxed under the estate tax system at least once
every generation. Under prior law, the tax applied to transfers in trust, but
not to direct transfers. See I.R.C. § 2611(a) (1982). The Gallo brothers hired a
lobbyist who successfully convinced Ways and Means to adopt an amendment.
See Jackson & Birmbaum, 'Gallo Amendment' Backed by Wine Family Opens
Multimillion-Dollar Estate-Tax Loophole, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1985, at 64, col. 1.
It is, of course, possible that the amendment was viewed as "good" tax re-
form. Indeed, the sponsor, Representative Jenkins, characterized the measure
as "my little pro-family amendment." Id On the other hand, the Gallo clan
has made at least $325,000 in campaign donations, divided fairly evenly be-
tween Democrats and Republicans, in the past four federal elections. Id
Moreover, according to Treasury's estimates, fewer than 350 taxpayers would
benefit from the Gallo amendment. Representative Jenkins, however, denied
sponsoring the amendment for any particular individual: "I don't know Mr.
Gallo, never met him." Id. Despite the limited applicability, the enacted bill
retains the Gallo amendment, permitting a one-million-dollar exclusion per
transfer for all generation-skipping transfers, except that the final bill elimi-
nated the latter exclusion after 1989. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 1433(b)(3), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085.
170. "President Reagan's effort to overhaul the federal tax system has re-
sulted in a financial windfall for the campaign coffers of most members of
Congress' tax-writing committees." Pressman, supra note 122, at 1806.
171. See, e.g., M. MALBIN, MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES--
FINANCING ELECTIONS IN THE 1980s 249-56 (1984); L. SABATO, supra note 135,
at 125.
172. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
173. One report notes that "there hasn't been an increase in the 65-cent-a-
case federal tax on beer since the Korean War, and nobody is seriously propos-
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have extracted substantial revenue for not taxing. The brewing
industry has organized a coalition of brewers and wholesalers
to compensate key members of Congress. The coalition regu-
larly invites members of the tax-writing committees to its
meetings, paying honoraria of $2,000 per appearance, 174 and
thus purchases continued apathy for new beer tax legislation.
It is tempting to blame the entire process of procuring
favorable tax provisions and avoiding harmful ones on the pri-
vate beneficiaries who pay. This is the standard populist per-
spective: fat-cat lobbyists corrupt some upright but weak
legislator. As the discussion here makes clear, however, politi-
cians themselves are principal beneficiaries of the tax process,
profiting politically and personally through campaign contribu-
tions,175 speech and appearance fees,176 and in-kind benefits.177
Given the benefits to politicians themselves, one should antici-
pate that they would actively seek contributions rather than
wait for lobbyists to come to them. The 1985-86 tax season was
in fact noteworthy for the initiative taken by politicians to gen-
erate funds,178 using threats of harmful legislation to extract
funds from the special interest PACs. 7 9 Tax lobbyists said dur-
ing the latest round of tax reform that they have not seen
"such ravenous appetites for contributions in a non-election
year before."'8 0
III. DURABILITY OF TAXATION CONTRACTS
The taxation process described above is quintessentially
ing one right now." Jackson, Brewing Industry Organizes Lobbying Coalition
to Head Off Any Increase in U.S. Tax on Beer, Wall St. J., July 11, 1985, at 52,
col. 1.
174. "Members of House and Senate tax-writing committees regularly drop
by the coalition's monthly meetings to talk about budget and tax trends, [and]
pick up $2,000 appearance fees." Id. Although new beer taxes "haven't gener-
ated much interest in Congress," the president of the brewery trade associa-
tion says they "want to be prepared." Id.
175. See supra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
178. "[L]egislators began tapping contributors for dollars almost immedi-
ately after the 1984 campaign came to an end." Pressman, supra note 122, at
1807.
179. The arm-twisting is rarely subtle, and often verges on the blatant:
"House Republican leaders are sending a vaguely threatening message to busi-
ness political-action committees: Give us more, or we may do something rash."
Jackson, House Republicans Are Pressing PACs for Contributions, Wall St. J.,
June 27, 1985, at 38, col. 3.
180. Jackson, supra note 166.
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contractual. Both politicians and private interests find them-
selves better off through exchange. The contracts they write
are executory. The politician bargains for money now in ex-
change for the promise of legislative performance on taxes
later. The power to tax that status as a legislator confers can
be exercised or not, in the politician's discretion. How the poli-
tician uses that discretionary power, however, can be influ-
enced-quite legally-by payments from private parties
potentially affected by any taxes enacted or threatened. The
consideration for taxing or refraining from taxing varies from
votes and campaign contributions to direct payments and in-
kind benefits to a politician. In return, the politician will be ex-
pected to perform his part of the deal, enacting or defeating tax
legislation in the interests of the private contributor.
Viewing the taxation process as an executory contract, in
which politicians receive compensation for performing legisla-
tive services, leads to consideration of the durability of the con-
tracts. Politicians and private interests can agree to a long-term
deal or to a series of shorter-run arrangements. To return to
one example noted above,18 ' politicians can, and in 1985 did, re-
frain from increasing the excise tax on beer in return for
speaker's fees and other emoluments. If the deal between
brewers and politicians only ran through the end of 1985, how-
ever, the no-taxation contract would have to be renewed for
1986. If brewers refused in the new year to renew the compen-
sation, politicians then would have an incentive to exercise
their taxation power.
As with any contract, the parties generally get what they
pay for: long-term deals will cost more, because they involve
performance over a greater period. Both sides gain by making
long-term deals, all else equal. Longer contracts mean greater
certainty for private parties and lower transaction costs for
both sides. Longer contracts also have their risks, some partic-
ularly pronounced in recent years, which at least partly ex-
plains the accelerating rate of tax legislation. 8 2
A. THE PRIVATE PARTY'S PERSPECTIVE
1. Breach of Contract
From a private party's perspective, at least three perils are
associated with long-term legislative contracts. The first is sim-
181. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:913
TAX REFORM
ply the risk that the politician principally responsible for the
legislation or nonlegislation, who has been paid to further cer-
tain outcomes, may breach the contract. One would not, how-
ever, expect this to be a great risk. The politician who breaches
contracts in one legislative session will find the private benefi-
ciaries unwilling to continue contributing in the next session.las
Moreover, continued welshing would erode the value of the leg-
islator's promise, so that new special interests also would be un-
willing to pay in the subsequent session. Politicians, thus, strive
to perform their side of the deal.- 84
2. Impossibility of Performance
Simple failure of performance by individual politicians is
not as serious a problem for the integrity of long-term tax con-
tracts as two other sources of instability. One is the possibility
that the politician will not be in office for the full period cov-
ered by the contract. Even if the politician is honest and in-
tends to keep his side of the bargain, he may not remain in a
position to do so. A politician may retire early or, more likely,
be voted out of office after agreeing to some tax policy for some
future period. Performance is then impossible. His successor,
who is of course not a party to the deal, has no reason to adhere
to his predecessor's policy unless he also receives compensation.
183. This raises the possibility of what is often called the "last-period prob-
lem," the lack of incentive that a party has to perform his contractual duties
when he knows that he will never have to deal with the other party again. A
last-term congresswoman, for example, might breach her taxation contracts
with impunity, since she has already been paid for her services and will not be
in Congress to solicit further contracts in the future. As the example of Sena-
tor Long, infra note 184, illustrates, there need be no serious last-period prob-
lem in Congress. The most probable explanation is that many, perhaps most,
powerful legislators stay on in Washington as lobbyists, and so expect to con-
tinue to work with the same people and interests that they encountered while
in office. Thus, the last year of their tenure is not really a "last period" at all.
The phenomenon of increasing numbers of retired legislators becoming lobby-
ists is discussed in Easterbrook, supra note 132, at 79.
184. The efforts of recently retired Senator Russell Long, "master archi-
tect" of the prior version of the Internal Revenue Code, to preserve his text
from Reagan reforms have been noteworthy. See Birnbaum, Sen. Long, an Ar-
chitect of the Income-Tax Code, Is Ready to Protect Handiwork from "Reform,"
Wall St. J., May 7, 1985, at 64, col. 1. Because "[tihe president's tax-overhaul
assault comes in the waning days of the senator's tenure, [many observers
thought] that impending retirement might free [Senator Long] from the polit-
ical obligations that have tied him to 'special interest' legislation." Id. The ob-
servers, however, were wrong. Senator Long still battled "to preserve his
favorite tax breaks, including those that encourage business investment, em-
ployee stock ownership and domestic oil exploration, a business dear to his
home state." Id.
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Private beneficiaries of tax deals then would have to pay
again to obtain the performance already purchased from the
outgoing politician. New contracts would follow changes of
political office holders. 8 5 One possible reason for the accelera-
tion in the rate of congressional tax reconsiderations, then,
would be an increase in the rate of legislative turnover.
If the durability of contracts between special interests and
legislators is related to legislative tenure, tax activity and con-
gressional turnover should be correlated-the less durable the
legislator, the less durable the legislation. In fact, some notice-
able correlation does exist. Although in the last twenty years
there has been no discernible change in the overall incumbency
effect for House and Senate members, 8 6 the tenure of service
on the tax-writing committees has shown some interesting vari-
ations. For the eighty-ninth Congress in 1965-66, a period of
relative stability in the tax area, the average time a legislator
had served on the Ways and Means Committee was 4.84
terms. 87 By the ninety-fourth Congress in 1975-76, the average
tenure had fallen to 2.81 terms, a drop in longevity of over forty
percent. The decrease in length of service on Ways and Means
correlates with the acceleration of tax legislation discussed
above.' 88
Until the mid-1970s, the Ways and Means Committee char-
acteristically selected legislators from safe districts, thereby
185. The contracts that the new politicians make would not necessarily be
mere continuations of the old deals. Changes after the initial bargain was
made may mean that the terms offered by others for different tax policies will
be more attractive to politicians in positions to influence those policies. Addi-
tionally, the voting constituency of the new legislator may differ significantly
from that of the old one. In either event, the provisions of the new contracts
would differ from those of the old ones. The terms of the new contract are a
secondary point, however. Whether or not the new contracts continue the pol-
icies contracted for earlier, a new round of tax deals will follow changes in
political office.
186. The term "incumbency effect" refers to the likelihood that an incum-
bent seeking re-election will be returned to office. For the period 1946-1980,
the percentage of House incumbents successfully seeking re-election has
ranged from eighty to ninety-five percent. For Senate incumbents, the per-
centage has generally ranged from fifty-five to eighty-five percent. See N.
ORNSTEIN, T. MANN, M. MALBIN, A. ScHIcK & J. BIBBY, VITAL STATISTICS ON
CONGRESS, 1984-1985 EDITION, 49-51 (1984).
187. The authors derived this and the following figures concerning average
time of service on the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Commit-
tee from the composition of the committees as reported in successive volumes
of CONGRESSIONAL INDEX and CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY.
188. See supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text; cf. J. WITTE, supra note
3, at 182-90 (outlining tax legislation during the period).
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limiting turnover on the committee.L8 9 Typical of this process
was Chairman Wilbur Mills, who presided over the committee
almost unopposed at home for sixteen years. The system broke
down, however, around the time of the 1975-76 congressional
session, following Chairman Mills's nocturnal dip in the Tidal
Basin with a stripper, his subsequent revelation of alcoholism,
and finally his resignation. During the 1975-76 congressional
session, the committee experienced unusual turnover and
Chairman Mills was succeeded by Representative Al Ullman.190
Ullman was chairman for only six years before the incumbent,
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, assumed the position.' 91
The turnover phenomenon on the Senate Finance Commit-
tee has been similar. The average tenure for Finance Commit-
tee members in the eighty-ninth Congress was 5.76 terms. By
the ninety-fourth Congress, the average tenure had dropped to
4.22 terms, a fall in tenure of over twenty-five percent. Aver-
age tenure fell further to 3.45 terms as of the ninety-seventh
Congress in 1981-82. Although the average tenure served does
not perfectly foretell how long current legislators will serve in
the future, historical turnover provides some information to
special interests trying to gauge the likelihood that their
favorable legislation will be durable and, accordingly, how
much to pay for that level of durability.
For both the Ways and Means and the Finance Commit-
tees, average tenure has begun to climb again. For the ninety-
ninth Congress in 1985-86, the average tenure for Ways and
Means Committee members has risen to 4.39 terms, while aver-
age tenure has risen to 5.10 terms on the Finance Committee.
The increase in committee tenure by itself might suggest that
the accelerating rate of tax legislation should abate as longer-
term contracting reappears. Turnover, however, is only one
factor that might explain shorter-term contracting.
3. Need for Ancillary Contracts
A third risk associated with long-term contracts derives
from the structure of Congress itself, especially the committee
system and the House Ways and Means Committee. Constitu-
tionally, tax legislation originates in the House of Representa-
189. T. REESE, su ra note 116, at 90-92.
190. CONGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 135 (3d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO CONGRESS].
191. Id.
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tives and then may be amended by the Senate. 192 In the House,
the effective power over taxation has traditionally resided al-
most exclusively in the Ways and Means Committee.193 Practi-
cally, therefore, the chairmen of that committee and of any
relevant subcommittees are the most important congressional
actors in the tax-contract process. To secure favorable legisla-
tion or beneficial legislative inaction, however, a committee or
subcommittee chairman must secure the cooperation and votes
of others, which requires a series of ancillary contracts. As part
of the chairman's contract with private interests, then, he has
to muster the votes of many legislators. Moreover, the involve-
ment of Treasury experts, committee staff, and others brings
even more players into the game.
The more players in the game, the more risky long-term
contracting for tax legislation becomes. Like their prominent
committee chairman, less prominent but nevertheless influen-
tial actors also resign or lose office, and their successors have
no obligation to abide by their predecessors' contracts. Turno-
ver, however, is only part of the problem. More important, the
sheer number of persons whose cooperation must be obtained
makes it more difficult for committee and subcommittee chairs
to deliver on their own taxation contracts. This is particularly
true for those actors-congressional staff and Treasury experts,
for example-who cannot be compensated for producing
favorable tax legislation the way legislators can be.
The difficulty of procuring the cooperation of fellow legis-
lators and other key players thus may provide another explana-
tion for the increasing frequency of tax code amendments. That
is, if over time the number of actors in the process has in-
creased and the chairman's control over them has diminished,
longer-term contracts predictably would become less popular.
Amendments to the tax code would become more frequent.
In fact, numerous changes to the committee system
promulgated by House Democrats in the mid-1970s' 94 have had
the effect of increasing the number of players and of decreasing
the chairperson's control. The larger committees were ex-
panded. Ways and Means in particular grew from twenty-five
to thirty-seven members.195 The new system also required
committees to establish at least four permanent subcommit-
192. See supra note 108.
193. T. REESE, supra note 116, at 110-11, 124-26.
194. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 190, at 473.
195. 1d at 467.
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tees, 196 each with its own chairman. This change greatly frag-
mented the power previously held by the full committee
chairman.19 7 The changes effectively established a "subcommit-
tee bill of rights," which included the right of various subcom-
mittees to review a single bill simultaneously. 198  The
subcommittee system effectively ended the ability of powerful
committee chairs to make good on legislative promises by
weakening the committee system.199
The role of nonelected employees has grown considerably
since 1970 as well. The number of committee employees bal-
looned from fewer than 400 in 1946 to over 3,000 in 1980, with a
significant portion of the increase occurring during the 1970s.20 0
Along with the growth in numbers, according to some members
of Congress, has come a corresponding growth in the influence
of nonelected officials.201 To a considerable extent, the growth
of staff is itself due to the desire to diffuse power previously
held by the committee chairperson. When the subcommittee
structure was imposed in the 1970s, for example, each subcom-
mittee chairperson and each ranking minority member was au-
thorized to hire a staff person for subcommittee work.20 2 In the
Senate, staff increases were ordered in response to complaints
from junior senators, who wanted some of the same help that
more senior incumbents had.20 3
196. Id- at 473.
197. Moreover, the entire Democratic membership of the full committee,
not just the chairman, now determines the number and jurisdiction of subcom-
mittees. Id-
198. This "multiple referral" resulted in an increase in political infighting.
Easterbrook, supra note 132, at 58-59. The proliferation of issues following the
rise of subcommittees is reflected in the number of votes in Congress itself. In
1960, there were 180 roll-call votes in the House, .7 per work day; in 1970,
there were 443 votes, 1.3 per work day; but in 1980 there were 1,276 roll-call
votes, 3.9 per day. In the Senate, roll calls have risen from 1.5 per day in 1960
to 3 in 1980. I& at 61.
199. One report quotes a veteran lobbyist:
There used to be two to five guys on each side [House and Senate]
who had absolute control over any category of bills you might want.
All you had to do was get to them. Now getting the top guys is no
guarantee. You have to lobby every member on every relevant sub-
committee and even the membership at large.
Id at 73.
200. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 190, at 477.
201. One report states that "[t]he growing impact that committee staff is
having on legislation has become a subject of concern. There is a feeling
among some members [of the House and Senate] that too many decisions are
getting away from the persons that were elected to make them." Id.
202. Id. at 473.
203. Id at 481.
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An immediate result of greater staff numbers was an in-
crease in the amount of legislation that the committees re-
viewed.20 4 A greater number of bills, of course, introduces new
sources of uncertainty into any long-term promise to provide
tax or other sorts of legislative benefits. The uncertainty is par-
ticularly pronounced when some of the provisions will embody
policy innovations from nonelected staff who cannot legally be
paid directly for any legislative promises. The independent role
of congressional staffers in whatever legislation results is re-
flected in increased attention that lobbyists now direct to staff
members in addition to elected officials.20 5 The heightened in-
dependence combined with the increased size of the staff has
meant that lobbyists must now deal with a significantly greater
number of participants in the tax legislation process.20 6
Given the advantages of contractual durability to all par-
ties, the mid-1970s collapse of the congressional committee sys-
tem that previously had facilitated long-term contracting is
curious. The reasons for the collapse are beyond the scope of
this Article, except for the questions the collapse raises about
the future of tax deals. If the restructuring of Congress was a
one-time event, the flurry of new tax contracts that resulted in
the late Seventies and now the Eighties may also be a one-time
affair. Ultimately, as turnover stabilizes, committee size levels
off, and greater political control is re-established, longer-term
tax deals would again be written. It is simply too soon to tell
whether the legislative disruptions of ten years ago were aber-
rant or symptomatic of longer-run trends.
B. THE POLITICIAN'S PERSPECTIVE
Just as the proliferation of congressional changes in the
1970s created doubt about the likelihood that legislators would
perform on longer-term contracts, so did simultaneous changes
among private interests make longer-term tax deals less attrac-
tive to politicians. A principal disadvantage to a politician who
makes tax deals with private interests that are binding into the
204. Md at 483.
205. See supra text accompanying note 161. As one lobbyist complains,
"'until fairly recently many congressmen played active roles in the legislative
detail work. Now they can't. Nobody can. The staff does the detail work, and
so you must lobby the staff.'" Easterbrook, supra note 132, at 75 (quoting Ei-
ler Ravnholt, former administrative assistant to Senator Daniel Inouye of
Hawaii).
206. "[W]here before there were a few important individuals on the House
and Senate staffs, now there are thousands." Id.
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future is the possibility that other interests will later emerge
and offer more money for a conflicting deal. To the extent that
new private interests are expected to emerge tomorrow with
cash in hand, politicians will want to preserve their legislative
flexibility by making only short-term contracts today.
In fact, the number of payors for legislative favors has
grown in the past fifteen to twenty years. Between 1950 and
1967, the number of registered lobbyists was practically un-
changed, growing from 430 to 449.207 By 1984, however, lobby-
ists numbered about 6,000, and by 1985 the figure had jumped
to 8,000.208 Vigorous growth of PACs has paralleled that of lob-
byists. The number of corporate political action committees
grew from eighty-nine in 1974 to more than 1,500 in 1983.209
From the evidence presented above,2 10 PACs and lobbyists are
effective intermediaries between politicians and private benefi-
ciaries, facilitating the sorts of payments that obtain special leg-
islative consideration. As long as the number of PACs and
lobbyists willing to pay is growing, however, politicians predict-
ably would prefer to make shorter-term deals.
IV. TAX LEGISLATION IN 1984-1986 AND BEYOND
The tax reform process that began in 1984 presents in a mi-
crocosm many of the features of tax legislation discussed in this
Article. What started with the President's call for a Treasury
study in January 1984 became President Reagan's tax proposal
in May 1985, was substantially altered by the House Ways and
Means Committee, and passed by the House in December 1985.
207. CONG. Q. SERV., LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS 28 (2d ed. 1968).
208. Lobbyists' Price to Persuade Congress Hits $49 Million in '85, Atlanta
J., June 5, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
209.
GROWTH IN CORPORATE PACs
Year Number of Corporate PACs Annual % Increase
1974 89 -
1975 139 56.2
1976 433 211.5
1977 550 27.0
1978 784 42.5
1979 949 21.0
1980 1204 26.9
1981 1327 10.6
1982 1467 11.2
1983 1536 4.7
The above figures are taken from L. SABATO, supra note 135, at 12-13.
210. See supra notes 117-80 and accompanying text.
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When the bill moved over to the Senate Finance Committee,
Chairman Packwood elected to start from scratch rather than
make changes to the House bill.21 1 As a result, the Chairman's
initial proposal bore scant resemblance to the House version.212
When it became apparent that the Packwood version was
in trouble in April 1986, hearings were suspended, and an en-
tirely new proposal was considered and passed in June 1986.213
The Conference Committee then set to work reconciling the
vast differences between the House and Senate versions, arriv-
ing at a compromise bill in September 1986,214 which conferred
an additional three billion dollars worth of special breaks, in
the form of "transition rules," beyond the more than seven bil-
lion dollars worth of such breaks already present in the House
and Senate versions.215 After it passed both houses in Septem-
211. See Birnbaum, Hesitant Senate Panel Asks Chairman to Prepare Draft
of Tax-Overhaul Bil Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
212. For a comparison of the President's proposal, the House bill, and
Chairman Packwood's initial effort, see JOINT Comm. ON TAx'N, 99TH CONG.,
2D SESS., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS IN CONNECTION WITH COMMTTEE ON FI-
NANCE MARKUP (Joint Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEEPRINT].
213. For a short history of the 1986 tax bill, see Birnbaum, Tax Bill Saga:
How a Pre-Emptive Political Step Became a Plan to Restructure Taxation in
the U.S., Wall St. J., June 4, 1986, at 62, col. 1.
214. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at I1 (1986).
215. Birnbaum, Legislators Finish Tax-Overhaul Draft Dispensing $3 Bil-
lion in Special Breaks, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1986, at 4, col. 2. Birnbaum notes
that the "largesse" provided in the 2,000 page bill filed by the Conference
Committee on Sept. 18, 1986, was "given out . . . [to] ostensibly smooth the
transition from the current tax system to the new one, but the decision about
who gets the benefit is often a political one." Id. The new rules contained in
the Conference bill provided benefits to such interests as two Chrysler plants
($78 million), GM's Saturn Plant ($70 million), Beneficial Corp. ($67 million),
a William H. Zimmer power plant in Ohio ($71 million), the Texas Air acquisi-
tion of Eastern Airlines ($47 million), and certain insurance companies ($103
million). Id. For a more complete listing of the transition rules, see Confer-
ence Agreement Transition Rules and Beneficiaries, 33 TAX NOTEs 75 (1986).
For an illustration that the grant of a transition favor is a political deci-
sion, consider the transition rule successfully inserted by Senator Long of Lou-
isiana and Representative Pickle of Texas. Under current law, a taxpayer
cannot take a charitable deduction for a contribution to a college or university
if in return the taxpayer receives the right to purchase preferred seating at
football games and other sporting events. Senator Long and Representative
Pickle pushed through a transition rule exempting Louisiana State University
(Long's alma mater) and the University of Texas (Pickle's alma mater) from
the rule. Gutfeld, Athletic Gifts to Universities Arouse the IRS, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 20, 1986, at 29, col. 3. For another example of the political benefits of
transition rules, see Sheppard, Dole Stands to Benefit from Ruan Trucking
Transition Rule, 34 TAx NOTEs 87 (1987).
One casualty of this and other transition rules is the English language. In
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ber, President Reagan signed the bill reported out of Confer-
ence on October 22, 1986, thus enacting the Tax Reform Act of
1986216 into law.
The roles of four major special interests-insurance, oil
and gas, timber, and steel-illustrate the legislative process cul-
minating in the 1986 bill. The first three special interests paid
legislators to forestall harmful tax legislation. The steel indus-
try, on the other hand, paid legislators for helpful legislation.
Under the President's original proposal, a life insurance
policyholder would have had to include as income the inside
buildup on the policy.217 Fearing that the increased burden
would, at the margin, make insurance a less attractive invest-
ment vehicle for taxpayers, the insurance lobby contributed
generously to tax-writers.2 1 8 By the time the tax bill moved out
of the House, the taxation of inside buildup had been elimi-
nated.21 9 Other insurance-related benefits also were retained,
including the employee's exclusion for employer-purchased
term life insurance, tax-free borrowing on life insurance poli-
cies, and present law retention of life insurance company
reserves. 220 The life insurance industry thus avoided imposition
of harmful tax legislation through contracts with the tax-
writers.
Oil and gas special interest groups similarly were able to
forestall detrimental legislation. The Ways and Means Com-
mittee bill initially would have curtailed the depletion allow-
ance and the deduction of intangible development costs
principle, a transition rule is intended to ease the shock of newly passed legis-
lation. See Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 520-36 (1986). The Long-Pickle transition rule, however, is a perma-
nent "transition" rule.
216. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2058.
217. See JOINT COMIUTTEE PRINT, supra note 212, at 107. "Inside buildup"
is the increase in the excess of the policy's cash surrender value over the pre-
miums paid during the taxable year.
218. Most members of the Ways and Means Committee as well as the Fi-
nance Committee have accepted large sums from insurance PACs. See Jack-
son, Insurance Industry Boosts Political Contributions As Congress Takes Up
Cherished Tax Preferences, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 64, col. 1.
219. Jonr Col nTrTEE PINT, supra note 212, at 107. The Act, as passed,
does not tax inside buildup. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§§ 1001-1004, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified
at I.R.C. §§ 101(d), 130(c), 264(a), 165(h) (West Supp. 1987)).
220. See Jackson, supra note 218. The final Act did not change these provi-
sions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1001-1004, 1011-1013,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of I.R.C.).
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(IDCs).221 But insurance industry contributions to tax-writers
totaled more than $670,000 to tax-writers between 1983 and
June 30, 1985.222 Ultimately, the Senate rewarded the persis-
tence of oil and gas special interests. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee proposal retained current law treatment of depletion
and IDCs. 223 Furthermore, although the Finance Committee
imposed passive income limitations on almost all limited part-
nerships, 224 an exception was carved out for working interests
in oil and gas properties even if the taxpayer does not partici-
pate in the investment.225 Thus, oil and gas interests, like the
insurance interests, were able to bid away the initial legislative
threats of adverse tax consequences.
Various timber interests also fought harmful provisions
that were present in the Ways and Means version, convincing
the Senate Finance Committee to restore favorable treatment.
The Ways and Means version would have stopped the immedi-
ate deduction of expenses for the growing of timber, replacing
it with less valuable amortization provisions. 226 The House ver-
sion also repealed a ten percent tax credit for reforestation ex-
penses.227 Senator Packwood, a timber-minded Oregonian
whose PAC receipts were discussed above,228 protected timber
deductions from the congressional ax and restored the refores-
tation tax credit.2 29
221. JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 212, at 71-72.
222. Jackson, supra note 107.
223. See JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., SummARY OF TAX
REFORM PROVISIONS IN H.R. 3838 AS ORDERED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE (May 12, 1986). The Conference Committee adopted the Senate bill's
favorable treatment with respect to depletion. With regard to IDCs, however,
the Committee adopted a compromise, only slightly less favorable than prior
law. The Act increases the required capitalization from twenty percent to
thirty percent of total IDCs and the amortization period from three to five
years. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 411, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 291 (West Supp.
1987)).
224. Essentially, losses could only offset income from activities in which
the taxpayer does not materially participate. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 501, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085
(codified at I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987)).
225. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 744 (1986). The Tax Reform
Act retained the exception for working interests in oil and gas properties. See
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987)).
226. See JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 212, at 67.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
229. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-117 to -118
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In addition to the examples of payments to avoid
threatened legislation, the 1986 bill is rife with purchased legis-
lation. One small example speaks volumes. Under current law,
taxpayers could not generally deduct the cost of conventions
outside North America, in places like Bermuda and certain
Caribbean Sea countries. 230 The Senate Finance Committee
bill treated Bermuda as being within the North American area
and permitted deductions if "the President certifies that such
treatment is in the national security interest of the United
States. '23 1 The apparently tenuous connection between na-
tional security and a convention of the argyle socks trade asso-
ciation in Bermuda becomes clearer once one realizes that
Senator Packwood and his wife were flown to Bermuda for
"sensitive and important discussions" in July 1985, after which
the Senate bill enhancing Bermuda's tax status appeared.232
Ultimately, however, the Conference Committee bill did not
adopt the Senate's Bermuda provision.233
Another example of a purchased beneficial tax provision,
however, survived the conference agreement and became law.
As proposed by the Senate Finance Committee and adopted in
the Tax Reform Act, the steel industry stands to receive about
$500 million in cash from the government for unused invest-
ment tax credits.234 Although the Act eliminates the invest-
ment tax credit, 235 a special "transition rule" 236 permits the
(1986). The Act, as adopted, retains the prior favorable law with respect to ex-
pensing preproductive costs and the ten percent reforestation credit. Id.
230. Under § 274(h)(6) taxpayers could not deduct as expenses the costs of
conventions in Bermuda and certain Caribbean countries unless the countries
met specified requirements. See I.R.C. § 274(h)(6) (West Supp. 1986); H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 814, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-31 (1986).
231. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1986).
232. See Birnbaum, Senate Panel's Overhaul Bill Doubles as Spoils System
to Provide Tax Favors, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
233. See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-31 to -32 (1986).
234. See Birnbaum, supra note 215, at 4, col. 2; Birnbaum, Finance Panel
Head Claims 31 Senators Will Help Oppose Tax-Bill Amendments, Wall St. J.,
May 30, 1986, at 3, col. 2; Birnbaum, Tax Break for Steel Industry Inserted in
Legislation Sparks Senators'Protests, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
235. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 49 (West Supp.
1987)).
236. See supra note 215. The final bill contained approximately 340 "tran-
sition rules," providing $10.6 billion in special benefits to particular interests.
Birnbaum, supra note 215. The steel industry benefit was carried over from
the Senate bill, which together with the House bill conferred over seven bil-
lion dollars in special tax breaks, id., for supporters of the tax-writing commit-
tees. The Conference Committee added another three billion dollars of
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steel companies a fifteen year carryback of unused investment
tax credits2 37 enabling them to receive a cash refund. The im-
mediate cash payment offers better tax treatment than steel
companies would experience under the prior law.238 In general,
industries with unused tax credits do not receive refunds for
unused credits.239
The 1986 Tax Reform Act has been hailed as the most sig-
nificant tax legislation in the past twenty-five years.240 The
rhetoric, however, cannot disguise what the voluminous act
reveals. Nobody pays for simplification. Like its predecessors
over the past twenty years, the new code will do nothing to
simplify or stabilize the current system. Even those provisions
that appear to simplify are misleading. For example, the
capital gains preference is eliminated, but the capital
gains/ordinary income distinction is retained in anticipation of
future tax increases.24 1 The Act reduces the fourteen current
individual tax rates to two-fifteen and twenty-eight percent.
24
Whether faced with fourteen or two rates, a taxpayer will still
consult a table accompanying the Form 1040 to compute taxes
due. Moreover, because of the phase-out of the fifteen percent
rate above a specified income level, the marginal rates after
1987 actually range up to thirty-three percent on some portions
of a taxpayer's income and must be computed with reference to
two or three different income figures rather than the simple
"transition rules" to the final bill to "ease its passage" by the full Congress.
See id.
237. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 212, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085.
238. Under the prior law, unused credits could only be carried back three
years and forward fifteen years. I.R.C. § 39 (West Supp. 1986). The steel com-
panies thus would have had to wait for future profitable years to offset the
credits against tax liability.
239. A similar transition rule applies to farmers, but it limits the carryback
to $750. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 213, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085.
240. Fessler, Ways and Means Finishes Tax Code Overhaul, 43 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2483 (1985); see also Remarks on Signing HR 3838 into Law, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1423, 1423, 1425 (Oct. 27, 1986) (referring to the bill
as "the most sweeping overhaul of Tax Code in our nation's history" and as "a
revolution").
241. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-70 (1986); A Complete
Guide to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Fed. Taxes (P-H) 301 (Oct. 18, 1986).
242. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMin. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp.
1987)).
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"taxable income" figure in use now.243
Moreover, the Act preserves assignment of income pos-
sibilities, preserves special treatment for a variety of industries,
such as oil and gas, timber, and insurance, and adds several bi-
zarre provisions that have tax planners panting in anticipation.
The new provision aimed at curtailing tax shelters offers new
challenge to the best and brightest tax professionals of our
day.244
CONCLUSION
The traditional public finance theory of taxation is of lim-
ited help in understanding the acceleration of tax change. In
the traditional theory, taxation is a response to the need for an
efficiency-minded government to provide goods that the private
market cannot provide or to correct externalities generated by
private markets. This model ignores many aspects of the real
world of taxation, in which politicians take the initiative in
soliciting funds-for themselves, not for production of public
goods. Politicians' personal demands-whatever their concern
with private externalities-also drive the tax legislation
process.
The variables discussed in this Article may not explain all
of the acceleration in tax reform. All other things equal, how-
ever, the process of contracting for particular tax legislation de-
scribed here would unquestionably increase the amount of tax
change. Like so many other kinds of regulation, politicians pro-
vide taxation and nontaxation to those willing to pay for their
preferred tax policy. One routinely observes salient aspects of
the tax-contracting process: payments made by private benefi-
ciaries to politicians in a position to influence tax outcomes,
with favorable legislation or legislative forebearance delivered
in return.
The willingness of the parties to contract depends, how-
ever, on the likelihood of the politicians' keeping their part of
the bargain. One principal impediment to politicians' perform-
ing executory contracts is that they may be voted out of office.
As the turnover of incumbents increases, private beneficiaries
will shorten the terms of the contracts offered, instead prefer-
243. See Hevener, The Hidden Fifty Percent Marginal Rates of H.R. 3838,
31 TAx NOTEs 1341 (1986).
244. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified at I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp.
1987)).
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ring to renegotiate a series of shorter-term deals. Turnover on
the tax-writing committees did in fact rise in the past decade or
two. Predictably, the rate of tax reconsideration has proceeded
apace.
A second impediment to politicians' performing their con-
tracts is the need to secure votes and other types of cooperation
from a large number of actors. If it becomes more difficult to
control others whose approval is needed, less contracting for
long-term tax legislation will result. In fact, diminished control
over other players in the tax game has been frequently noted
by congressional observers. Likewise, an increase in the sheer
number of persons involved in legislating, such as that occur-
ring in the 1970s with tax legislation, will enhance the relative
attraction of short-term contracts. Finally, from the politician's
standpoint, increasing numbers of lobbyists and PACs willing
to pay for legislative action and inaction has also made shorter-
term tax deals more attractive.
In the end, one must ask what difference accelerating tax
legislation makes. The discussion here has not tried to analyze
all the economic effects of periodic tax revision. There are
wide economic implications of accelerating tax change.245 Use
of resources, including politicians and lobbyists, in contesting
the share of taxes to be paid by particular interests diverts
those resources from productive to redistributive activity.
246
Moreover, the possibility of future changes in the "rules of the
game" that will tax away more of one's wealth creates a disin-
centive to wealth-creation in the first place.247 Uncertainty
alone is a disincentive to productive activity. A survey of the
United States Chamber of Commerce's membership, taken
while the tax bill was being debated, found that forty-two per-
245. That is to say, there are broad implications of a system in which "the
allocation of tax shares among individuals and groups in the economy and the
choice of tax instruments that generate the imputations of such shares are
considered 'up for grabs' during each and every budgetary period." G. BREN-
NAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 72, at 190.
246. As one discussion explains, the tax code
creates wealth transfers, and interest groups will accordingly have an
incentive to spend resources in efforts to prevent part of their wealth
from being taxed away or to shift some of their liabilities to other
groups. They organize, invest in lobbying activities, contribute to
political campaigns, advertise their point of view, and so forth. These
expenditures reduce the welfare of society as a whole because they
are made in pursuit of income redistribution rather than in income-
increasing activities.
Shughart, supra note 82, at 4.
247. This point is discussed in McChesney, supra note 82.
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cent have delayed investment decisions because of uncertainty
over the final shape of the bill.248 Other private and govern-
ment surveys similarly showed great weakness in real invest-
ment spending for 1986.249
Furthermore, the next time Congress attempts to en-
courage behavior in the private sector through tax incentives, it
will have to raise the ante because taxpayers will be more mis-
trusting. For example, those who have invested in capital as-
sets expecting a maximum tax of twenty percent on any gain
when those assets are sold may now face a twenty-eight percent
rate on any gain. In the future, if Congress were again to lower
the rate on capital assets, some taxpayers would be reluctant to
change their spending patterns for fear that the rate might
again be increased before they were ready to sell. To attract
those taxpayers, Congress will have to lower the initial tax rate
even more.
Is the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the end, or even a pause, in
a cycle of annual tax reform? The inexorable march toward
complexity and revision is hardly slowed by the current act and
will undoubtedly continue. There are ominous signs from both
the White House and Capitol Hill that the new Congress will
find tax "reform" as attractive as the old.2 50 Senator Bentsen
has already proven himself a worthy heir to Senator Packwood
as Chairman of the now-Democratic Senate Finance Commit-
tee.251 Over the next few years, tax changes are likely to be
248. Rahn, Making Sure Tax Reform Works, Wall St. J., June 26, 1986, at
30, col. 3.
249. Id See also Clark, Taxes Can Be Expensive Even Before You Pay
Them, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 29, col. 3 (tax reform "has greatly increased
economic uncertainty at a time when there already was plenty of it around").
250. See, e.g., Boyd, Reagan May Seek Tax Bill Changes After Enactmen
N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Congressman Rostenkowski has said
that "[e]veryone knows we will eventually need a tax increase." Locking In
the Pols, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1986, at 28, col. 1. Senator Bentsen agrees: "If
nothing else, you're going to have a very major technical-corrections bill, and
that's the least you're going to have." Birnbaum, In Turning to Defici Con-
gress May Tinker with the Taxes Again, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
So does the chief of staff of the Joint Conference Committee on the last tax
act, who estimates that the next round of tax reform will come within less
than a year. Burns, Tax Revision Made Not So Easy, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986,
at 32, col. 3.
251. The Washington Post broke a story that Senator Bentsen offered 200
Washington lobbyists and political action committee directors the opportunity
to have breakfast with him once a month as the "Chairman's Council." The
cost of the monthly breakfasts was to be a $10,000 contribution to the Sena-
tor's campaign fund. Bentsen invited the lobbyists noting, "I will be relying on
members of the Chairman's Council for advice, assistance and early financial
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termed "technical corrections." Whatever the name, however,
special interests will provide the feed as long as tax-writers and
other legislators belly up to the trough.
support crucial to a successful campaign." Many lobbyists were reluctant not
to join the Council, fearing a loss of access to the Senator. Edsall, Breakfast
With the Senate Finance Chairman-for $10,000, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1987, at
Al, col. 1. Senator Bentsen offered to hold multiple breakfasts if the Council
got too large. Id The reaction to the Washington Post story was so strong
that Senator Bentsen decided to disband the Council and return the contribu-
tions of the estimated forty lobbyists who had already made contributions.
Senator Bentsen's predecessor, Senator Packwood, had a similar council but
only charged $5,000 for the privilege. Timberlake, Revelation of Members'
Breakfast Clubs Renews Controversy Over PACs' Influence, 34 TAX NOTES 541
(1987); Senator Scraps $10,000 Breakfas4 Atlanta J., Feb. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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